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Abstract
BRUCE A. DESMARAIS: Modeling Interdependence in Collective
Political Decision Making.
(Under the direction of Thomas Carsey.)
Fundamental to many accounts of decision-making within political institutions is the
interdependence between simultaneous choices. For instance, members in a legislature
are hypothesized to take voting cues from party leaders, and the chief justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court is thought to vote with the majority on the merits so as to assign opinion
authorship. In this thesis I show that none of the conventional methods that have been
used by political scientists for testing theories of simultaneous interdependence are
statistically sound. I then propose a machine-learning algorithm that finds unmodeled
interdependence in discrete-choice data. Next, I develop a novel statistical model that
allows the researcher to explain – in a methodologically appropriate manner – the
probability that an actor makes a particular choice as well as the probability that a
collective-decision occurs in a particular form. In the last chapter of my dissertation,
I demonstrate that U.S. Supreme Court case outcomes are interdependent and that
the U.S. Supreme Court is best characterized as an institution striving to produce an
ideologically optimal body of law rather than ideologically optimal independent case
outcomes.
iii
I dedicate this work to my wife, my lifesaver, Rebecca; and also to my parents,
Bruce and Lisa.
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Chapter 1
Lessons in Disguise: Multivariate
Predictive Mistakes in the study of
Repeated Collective Choice
“The applied statistician should avoid models that are contradicted by the data in rel-
evant ways - frequency calculations for hypothetical replications can monitor a model’s
adequacy and help to suggest more appropriate models.”
-Donald B. Rubin (1984)
1.1 Repeated Collective Decisions
Central processes studied in every field of empirical political science arise in the form
of repeated collective decisions.. Roll-call votes in legislatures and decisions issued by
multi-member courts of appeal are stable groups of political actors issuing individual
decisions that are aggregated into salient collective outcomes. In the international
arena, intervention into civil wars, the provision of relief for natural disasters, and
the issuance of trade sanctions are interdependent decisions rendered repeatedly by a
stable group of states. Due to the importance of the collective outcomes that result from
individual decisions (e.g. laws written or the results of civil wars), and the fact that
actors have multiple opportunities to learn optimal strategies for interaction, patterns
of dependence or relationships are likely to emerge in repeated collective choice data.1
However, in political science applications, we often pool the members of the stable
group into a sample for regression modeling where relationships between the members
are ignored to the extent that they are not captured by independent variables. If such
relationships do exist (e.g. if members of the U.S. House of Representatives learn over
time to take cues from certain policy specialists or party leaders, and issue roll-call votes
in the same direction as these leaders), statistical inferences from pooled regression
are subject to misspecification bias. Since the data contain repeated observations of
collective behavior, it can be used to learn about interdependence among the actors.
I propose an iterative method for learning about and modeling these dependencies.
Similar in structure to the approach advocated by Achen (2005), rather than estimate
an overly complicated model at the onset, I suggest specifying a simple model to start,
and updating it to address predictive deficiencies, subjecting the updated model to
rigorous conservative tests of the validity of those updates.
In many instances of repeated collective decision making, the salient collective out-
come (e.g. the result of a court case or the passage of legislation) is a deterministic
function of the individual decisions rendered by the members of the group (e.g. a lower
court decision is reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court if five or more justices vote with
the appellant). Because of this deterministic relationship between micro and macro-
level outcomes, if a model is fit to the individual decisions in the collective, a model
1Many scholars have noted that patterns of sophisticated rational interaction are likely to emerge
when collective choice situations are repeated many times, and actors can learn the rules and payoffs
of the game (see e.g. Verba (1961) and Ostrom (1998)).
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is automatically implied for the collective outcome.2 For instance, if a model is fit to
U.S. Supreme Court Justice’s vote on the merits – estimating the probability that each
individual justice will vote with the appellant in a case – the probability that the Court
decides in favor of the appellant is given by the sum of the joint probabilities of all
group configurations in which at least five of the nine justices vote with the appellant.
Due to the deterministic relationship between the micro and macro-level models
of collective decisions, from the standpoint of probability theory, it is inconsistent to
specify separate statistical models for individual decisions and higher-order configura-
tions of those decisions – the former implies the latter. The critical implication of the
micro-macro connection is that, in order to be correctly specified, the micro-level model
must capture any tendency for individual decisions to produce sophisticated/intentional
higher-order configurations. For instance, Hix, Noury and Roland (2005) find that there
are varying levels of political party cohesion in the European Parliament. If the findings
of Hix, Noury and Roland (2005) are valid, any micro-level analysis of roll-call voting
in the European Parliament is misspecified if it does not account for a varying ten-
dency towards intra-party cohesion in members’ votes. Extending an individual-level
decision model – often logistic regression where observations are assumed to be inde-
pendent conditional on the covariates – to allow for flexible forms of interdependence
commonly requires non-trivial and at times prohibitive computational effort to esti-
mate the dependence parameters.3 Rather than attempt to extend a micro-level model
to accommodate every configurational tendency that has either found support in the
2It is important to note that in making this statement I am assuming that the analyst is working
within either the likelihood or Bayesian estimation frameworks, or any other method used to fit a full
parametric distribution to the data.
3See e.g. Alvarez and Nagler (1998) for an example where preferences for electoral candidates
are posited to be correlated, Franzese and Hays (2007) for a discussion of the estimation challenges
in accounting for spatial dependence in time-series cross-section data, and Ward, Siverson and Cao
(2007) who find that latent reciprocal and transitive tendencies characterize international dyadic data
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literature or can be reasonably conceived, I develop a method to identify configurations
that are missed by a simple micro-level model – the analysis of which suggests the key
configurational extensions necessary to make valid inference on the micro-level pro-
cesses. The key mechanism underlying this procedure is a method of residual analysis
that is particularly suited for repeated collective choice data.
The systematic analysis of residuals from regression models has long been used to
monitor aspects of statistical fit with the goal of improving specification (see e.g. Cox
and Snell (1971), Achen (1977), Beck (1982) and Achen (2005)). Generally speaking,
residual analysis involves the comparison of observed data with predicted values from a
statistical model. There are at least two major general challenges in residual analysis.
First, with the generic goal of assessing the proximity of observed and predicted quan-
tities, the particular function(s) of the observed and predicted data to be compared
(e.g. expected value, variance, correlation, skewness etc.) must be insightfully chosen.
Second, the analyst must specify the level of divergence between the true and predicted
quantity that constitutes an interesting or potentially important deficiency. I introduce
the concept of a joint prediction error (JPE), which is a collective outcome that is ob-
served to occur with a much different frequency than predicted by a given statistical
model, and provide benchmarks for deciding what constitutes a JPE. In doing so, I
overcome a particular challenge that arises in the analysis of joint residuals. Given
n members of the collective, and interest in finding JPEs composed of k members,(
n
k
)
groups need to be considered, which can become a giant number for realistic size
collectives and even small k. For instance, if one is interested in monitoring predic-
tive accuracy of a model predicting legislative activity on all possible groupings of five
legislators in a 435 member chamber, there are 126, 837, 202, 212 groups to check, and
if k is increased to ten the number of groupings is multiplied by 474,925,189. I show
that algorithms common in the machine-learning literature, designed to find frequent
4
joint occurrences in databases of millions of commercial transactions, can be used to
efficiently search over all possible combinations of actors in the collective.
Finally, by replicating and extending two recently published studies, I demonstrate
how improvements in models of repeated collective discrete choice processes can be
discovered through the analysis of JPEs. I find that a logit model explaining Supreme
Court votes on the merits published by Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs (2006) crit-
ically understates the degree of case-level consensus on the Court. This observation
leads to an improved model specification that accounts for correlation between the jus-
tices and includes additional important case-level covariates, and the updated model
lends stronger support to one of the central theoretical claims in the original article.
In Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004), a study on international defense alliance activation,
the empirical model understates association among a state’s allies. Additionally, in the
defense alliance application, a pattern emerges in the JPEs which suggests that states
with greater consultation obligations are less likely to enter a war in defense of their
allies. Adding a measure of a state’s consultation obligations to the model in Gartzke
and Gleditsch (2004) (1) supports the insight that states with more consultation pacts
are less likely to support their allies and (2) suggests that the original central empirical
finding of the article – that democratic states are less likely to assist their allies – re-
sulted from the omission of consultation obligation. In both replications, the published
statistical analyses are improved by extensions suggested by the JPEs. Improvement
is verified through multiple model fit metrics.
1.2 Information, Data and Repeated Collective Choice
There are two reasons in particular to expect theoretical innovations to arise through
the inspection of joint prediction errors in the study of repeated collective choice. These
are consequences of the fact that most collective choice modeling in political science
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involves an intense focus on the numerous interactions of a relatively small set of very
well-known actors. First, simple labels – country names, legislative districts, justice
names, etc.– on the actors in the dataset communicate information to the analyst above
and beyond that which is contained in the rows and columns of the dataset. Second,
there is likely to be an overwhelming amount of previous theoretical and empirical
research that precedes any new study of historical political data. Both of these features
present unique opportunities for improvement with joint prediction error analysis.
In their analysis of the representational efficacy of majority-minority Congressional
districts, Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran (1996, pp. 810) state, “In many southern
state legislatures, [minority group leaders and Republicans] formed voting blocs when
passing redistricting plans, and the [U.S.] Justice Department under Republican presi-
dents was eager to create the maximum possible number of majority-minority districts.”
This represents rich information about the process under study – the motivations un-
derlying the formation of majority-minority districts – yet no data or citation to outside
work is provided. It is knowledge held by the authors, the validity of which was ac-
cepted at face-value by reviewers at the American Political Science Review. Anyone
who has presented at a conference, and been confronted with the one case (e.g. leg-
islator, country, year) that represents the perfect counter-factual to his or her theory,
knows that political scientists have auxiliary expertise – constituting information about
the observations above and beyond that which appears in the regression equation. If
a scholar of civil war intervention runs a logistic regression model on the intervention
decisions of states, he or she may recognize that the model poorly predicts outcomes in
which developed states decide to intervene and others do not without collecting addi-
tional data about countries. Such a recognition would serve as motivation to collect and
include in the model a measure of a state’s development. This auxiliary information
optimizes potential benefits from simply examining those combinations of cases that
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are poorly predicted by a given statistical model.
The second consequence of multiple studies of familiar observations is that the disci-
pline accumulates a predictable set of control variables that are considered potentially
serious omissions if left out of a model. For most salient topics in political science,
dozens of studies precede any new research. Most of these studies propose partially
unique explanations of a process and, thus, provide candidate control variables for any-
one who endeavors to model the same or similar data in the future. It is uncommon
and practically infeasible for one to include every variable that has ever been found to
significantly influence a process in a new analysis. Indeed, such a model would likely
lead to a convoluted interpretation, and be counter to the objective of data reduction
(Achen, 2005). At the same time, previous findings cannot be ignored simply for the
sake of time or parsimony. Examining joint prediction errors constitutes a reasonable
compromise between ignoring past work outright and including the entire preceding em-
pirical literature in an initial model. Knowledge about the approximate values of the
omitted factors can be checked for consistency with patterns in the JPEs. For instance,
judicial scholars are familiar with the seniority ranking of justices on the U.S. Supreme
Court. Analysis of joint errors from a model of Supreme Court voting would reveal
whether justices close in seniority were voting similarly, and, thus, whether seniority
should be added to the model.
1.3 Iterative Model Improvement Through Predic-
tion Error Analysis
The process I prescribe for developing the best statistical model of repeated collective
choice data rests on the observation of Rubin (1984) that frequency calculations per-
formed on the real data should not differ from model predictions in relevant ways. Once
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a model has been fit to data and is treated as the best possible model, it assumes the
position of the analyst’s null or assumed model. Quantities in the observed data that
differ considerably from predictions drawn from the model serve as evidence against
the null. When one fits a paremetric model to data, it is not only assumed that the
regression function is properly specified, but also that the structure of the variance,
association between the observations, and/or any other quantity that can be computed
on the data is correctly captured by the model. The intuition provided by Rubin (1984)
is that, if a model gives the correct distribution for the data, then it should not be pos-
sible to find distributional qualities of the data that contradict predictions derived from
the model.
There are five stages in one iteration of the model-fitting procedure I advocate:
1. Fit the model (M) that represents the best specification the analyst can currently
manage.
2. Draw many hypothetical datasets according to the probability distribution of the
data implied by the model.4
3. Identify joint prediction errors by finding combinations of outcomes that occur
with much greater or lesser frequency in the observed data than in the simulated
data predicted from the model.
4. Update the model to accommodate deficiencies that are hypothesized to produce
the prediction errors.
5. Assess, using model-fit metrics that favor a parsimonious specification, whether
the updated specification provides a better fit to the data than the model esti-
mated in step 1.
4It is possible that in simple cases the analytic distribution of the data will be available, but to
assure the algorithm is applicable when it is not available, I advocate simulation.
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This process can be repeated indefinitely, or until the analyst has no more intuition
about the deficiencies creating the prediction errors. For those wary of purely data-
driven procedures for model construction, it is critical to recognize the role of theory
in the fourth step. Without a thorough theoretical understanding of the process un-
der study, it will not be possible to recognize the significance of the JPE membership.
For instance, a Congress scholar may recognize – through inspection of the JPE mem-
berships – that a model of roll-call voting in the U.S. House poorly explains votes in
which members on the Appropriations Committee disagree with those on the Budget
Committee. Without at least a loose recollection of committee membership in the
House, it would not be possible to even recognize, never-mind explain, such a pattern.
Of course, any data-driven model-fitting procedure must guard against over-fitting the
sample data. This is what step 5 adresses. After presenting the algorithm used to
identify JPEs, I present a model fit metric that can be used to avoid over-fitting.
The specific metric used to determine whether a joint outcome constitutes a JPE is
the posterior predictive p-value introduced by Meng (1994) for general use in a Bayesian
context. This p-value can be used to asses the oddity of the frequency of a joint outcome
given predictions from a model. It would allow one to state whether, for instance, the
frequency of unanimous decisions on the U.S. Supreme Court is statistically significantly
different from the frequency of unanimous decisions predicted by a statistical model.
In the next few paragraphs, I review in detail, the construction of a predictive p-value.
In a Bayesian analysis, the prior distribution of the parameters (pi(θ)) represents
the analyst’s belief about the parameters prior to using the observed data (X). The
posterior distribution of the parameters (p(θ|X)) is the resulting belief regarding the
distribution of the parameters after updating the prior distribution with the observed
data. In a Bayesian analysis, point estimates are equal to the means of the posterior
distribution, and credible intervals – the Bayesian analog to the frequentist confidence
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interval – are derived from the quantiles of the posterior distribution (Gill, 2002). The
posterior distribution conditional on the observed data X is given by
p(θ|X) = l(X|θ)pi(θ)
tΘl(X|θ)pi(θ)dθ , (1.1)
where l(X|θ) is the likelihood function of the data given θ. If M is fit by maximum
likelihood, the asymptotic sampling distribution of θ is used as an approximation of
the posterior distribution of θ (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg
and King, 2003), which is multivariate normal with mean vector equal to the parameter
estimates (θˆ) and covariance matrix equal to the variance-covariance matrix of θˆ (Σˆ).
The posterior predictive distribution (PPD) of X is the expected distribution of future
replicates of X. It represents the analyst’s belief about the distribution of X after
updating with the available data (e.g. the expected distribution of justice-votes given
by the independent variables and regression coefficients in a model of voting on the U.S.
Supreme Court). The posterior predictive distribution f(Xnew) of the data is computed
by averaging the likelihood function over p(·|θ), and is given by
f(Xnew) =
∫
Θ
l(Xnew|θ)p(θ|X)dθ. (1.2)
In practice, p(θ|X) and/or fX(·) are often not available in closed form due to in-
tractability of the integrals in equations 1.1 and 1.2. In the typical Bayesian analysis,
using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, the researcher has a large sam-
ple from p(θ|X) rather than a formula for the posterior distribution. For example, in
a regression model with five predictors, if the MCMC algorithm was run for 10,000
iterations after an initial burn-in period, instead of a formula for p(θ|X), the analyst
would have a 10,000×5 matrix of regression coefficeints. In order to simulate from our
model, with the objective of comparing simulated and observed data, we need to use
10
Figure 1.1: Posterior Predictive Distribution Sampling Algorithm
t = number of desired draws from fX(·) (the PPD)
θˆ = D×P MCMC sample
X = N×M sample of observed data
Xˆ = Sample from the PPD initialized to ∅
for(i in 1 to t) begin
1. Draw θ(i) randomly from the rows of θˆ
2. Draw X
(i)
new (the same size as X) from l(Xnew|θ(i))
3. Store X
(i)
new in Xˆ
end
Xˆ now contains t random draws from fX(·)
this simulated approximation to p(θ|X) to approximate fX(·). The algorithm given
in figure 1.3 can be used to draw from the posterior predictive distribution using the
MCMC sample. When M is fit by maximum likelihood, the sample from the poste-
rior distribution derived through MCMC is replaced with a random sample from the
asymptotic sampling distribution.
P-values are commonly used in political science to measure the plausibility of some
null parameter (e.g. population mean, difference in means of two populations, the
regression coefficient in the population, the variance etc.) given an observed sample
counterpart of that parameter (i.e. statistic) and additional assumptions about the
data-generating process. Suppose it is of interest to assess the oddity or rarity of the
observed value of some statistic computed on the data (T (X)) given an assumption
about the distribution that generates X (f(X)). If it is possible to derive the distri-
bution of T (X) given f(X) (g(T (X))) (i.e. the sampling distribution in a classical
context), the placement of T (X) on g(T (X)) can be used to estimate the area under
g(T (X)) to the right (left) of a comparatively high (low) value of T (X) to derive a
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p-value. In the familiar regression framework, with a large sample, the regression coef-
ficient - T (X) - has a normal sampling distribution - g(T (X)) - with standard deviation
equal to the standard error of the regression coefficient. From this we know that the
regression coefficient is quite unlikely to be zero if it is at least two standard errors
away from zero. In the current application, T (X) is a joint prediction error, and the
process I describe below, through the approximation of g(T (X)), can be used to asses
whether the observed frequency of a joint outcome is significantly different than that
predicted by a model.
A considerable challenge in many settings is that, unlike the example of regres-
sion coefficients given above, the analytic sampling distribution (i.e. g(T (X))) is not
available in closed form for many combinations of T (X) and f(X). For instance, the
analytic sampling distribution of the sample median is rarely available in closed form
(Greene, 2008, pp. 597). Originally suggested by Rubin (1984), and thoroughly ex-
plored by Meng (1994), the posterior predictive p-value provides a general solution for
determining the rarity of an observed value of T (X) given a fully parametric specifica-
tion of f(X). If T (·) is computed on many draws of hypothetical data from M using
the posterior predictive distribution, the empirical distribution of T (X) over the draws
of X (h(T (X))) can be used as a substitute for g(T (X)). As the number of draws of
X from M approaches infinity, the tail area outside of T (X) on h(T (X)) approaches a
p-value for T (X) given M as the null model.
In the context of joint prediction error analysis, let T (X) be the number of times
a multivariate outcome (Γ) occurs in the data. As a hypothetical example, a possible
T (X) is the number of times Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton voted in the same
direction on roll-calls in the U.S. Senate. Using M as the null model, if Γ has a
posterior predictive p-value less than a tunable parameter α, it is classified as a joint
prediction error. Suppose that Obama and Clinton both issued votes in 100 roll-calls.
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To determine what the model predicts regarding their joint behavior, we can simulate
these 100 roll-calls 1000 times. Suppose that in 95% of the simulated 100 roll-calls,
they voted together in less than 75 of the roll-calls. If, in the 100 actual roll-calls,
they voted together in more than 75 of the votes, we would conclude that the model
under-predicts agreement between Obama and Clinton at the 0.05 level of statistical
significance.
To find joint prediction errors in a repeated collective choice dataset the p-value for
every possible Γ must be computed. As noted earlier, the universe of possible Γs can
be quite large. This poses a computational challenge in counting the frequency of Γ in
both the real and simulated data for all Γs. Thankfully, this counting problem is very
similar in structure to a challenge that has been considered in the machine learning
literature for decades – counting, in databases of millions of commercial transactions
for merchants offering thousands of products, the number of times product groupings
occur in shopping baskets (e.g. the number of times a T.V. Guide, fishing pole and neck
tie are all purchased together in transactions at Wal-Mart). Frequent itemset mining
is the general term that encapsulates work on finding product groupings that meet
certain criteria (Wen, 2004; Luo and Zhang, 2007). Treating the collective choice as
the transaction, and the individual decisions made by the actors as the product occur-
rences, frequent itemset mining algorithms can be used to count the joint occurrence
of individual decisions within collective choices. I take advantage of frequent itemset
mining algorithms in the implementations of JPE analysis below. 5
There are three parameters that must be set by the user of the algorithm outlined
above: the size of the joint prediction errors (k), the number of draws from f(Xnew) to
5Many of the algorithms available in the R package arules (Hahsler, Grn and Hornik, 2005) can
be combined to efficiently implement JPE analysis in large datasets. I am developing an R package
(JPEMiner), in which I wrap and structure a number of the algorithms in arules to efficiently perform
JPE analysis after the estimation of many discrete choice models familiar to political scientists.
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be used to compute the posterior predictive p-values (t), and the level of the p-value
(α) at which to classify the joint outcome as a prediction error. As I will demonstrate
through application later, a great deal of information is communicated in pairs. Pairs
contain all of the available information about what outcomes occur together. For this
reason, I suggest a default value of k = 2. It may be informative to move beyond k if
particular higher order configurations are of interest. For instance, if one were interested
in assessing whether a model accurately predicted intra-continental agreement in U.N.
Security Council votes, it would be possible to look at the pairwise predicted versus
observed agreements among all pairs within a continent, but it might be easier to
compare the predicted and observed occurrences of continent-level consensus. The
term α should be chosen to produce a manageable set of prediction errors – not so
low that no prediction errors are discovered, and not so high that every joint outcome
is considered a prediction error. Lastly, t should be set high (1,000–10,000) to start,
and the analysis should be repeated two or three times to assure the results are not
attributable to simulation error. If results differ across repetitions, t should be increase
until variation across repetitions is negligible. These suggestions represent reasonable
starting points for most applications, but should not be read as strict constraints on
the values of the tuning parameters.
It is important to emphasize that discovering a pattern in the JPE analysis does not
constitute rigorous statistical inference on the factors creating that pattern. The vali-
dation step comes after the model has been updated to account for patterns discovered
in the JPE analysis. The objective in the JPE analysis stage is to tune the parameters
(k, t, α) until either some intuition is reached regarding appropriate improvements to
M or it is clear that no meaningful discrepancy between the data and the distribution
implied by M can be found. The point is to push M to the breaking point in regards
to its consistency with the data, with the intention of reconstructing a stronger model
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through a theoretical account of the prediction errors produced by M . The validation
procedure presented next is used to judge the validity of the proposed updates to M .
1.3.1 Evaluating the Updated Model
As noted previously, observing a pattern in the joint residuals does not constitute
statistical confirmation of that pattern as a component of the data generating process.
Since the method of model improvement proposed here is fairly data-intensive, it is
desirable to use a relatively conservative method of evaluating the fit improvement
associated with the updates, so as to avoid over-fitting. The method I advocate is
cross-validation.
Cross-validation avoids over fitting by evaluating the fit of a model on data that was
not used to estimate the parameters of the model. The parameters of competing models
are estimated on the training set, and the relative fit is judged using the validation set
(data that was not used to estimate the model, but is considered to be drawn from the
same population as the training set) (Jensen and Cohen, 2000). Leave-one-out cross-
validation is a method of judging the predictive fit of a statistical model that provides
predictions for the outcome under study. Similar in structure to the computation
of Cook’s D - the popular outlier identification statistic used in regression modeling
(Cook, 1977) - in leave-one-out cross-validation every observation is iteratively used in
the training and validation sets, and therefore does not require the analyst to arbitrarily
exclude some of the data from estimation (Snee, 1977; Burman, 1989; Thall, Simon and
Grier, 1992).
In order to implement cross-validation, a predictive measure of the fit of the model
to the excluded observations must be identified. Many candidates have been con-
sidered including the cross-validated classification error for categorical outcomes (Leo
et al., 1984) and the cross-validated squared error for continuous outcomes (Hjorth,
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1993). A predictive measure that is particularly useful when the objective is to com-
pare fully parametric models is the cross-validated log-likelihood. The cross-validated
log-likelihood (CVLL) is computed by summing the log-likelihood of each observation
given the parameters estimated on the rest of the data set (θ−i) (Rust and Schmittlein,
1985; O’Sullivan, Yandell and Raynor, 1986; Verweij and Van Houwelingen, 1993; van
Houwelingen et al., 2006). A very common metric of distance between two probability
distributions is the Kullback-Leibler distance (Gelman, Meng and Stern, 1996; Clarke,
2003, 2007). In expectation, among a number of possible models, the model with the
highest CVLL is that with the minimum Kullback-Leibler distance from the model that
actually generated the data (the true model) (Cover and Thomas, 1991; Smyth, 2009).
Thus, if the updates to M move the specification closer to the true model, then, on
average, evaluation with the CVLL will indicate that the updates should be accepted.
The formula for the CVLL is given by
CV LL =
N∑
i=1
ln
[
l(xi|θ−i)
]
. (1.3)
The CVLL is extended to data that is organized hierarchically by clustering on a
single level (e.g. court case) – a structure common in repeated collective choice data
– by leaving out one cluster at a time and summing the log-likelihood of the left-out
clusters rather than leaving out a single observation (Price, Nero and Gelman, 1996).
To evaluate the fit of the various models specified in the current analysis, I compute
the CVLL as well as the BIC, another conservative measure of model fit, in each of the
applications below.
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1.4 Replications with JPE-Suggested Extensions
1.4.1 The U.S. Supreme Court and Oral Argument Quality
Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs (2006) test whether the quality of oral argument before
the U.S. Supreme Court influences the votes of the justices. Justice Harry Blackmun
graded the oral arguments of attorneys on an 8-point grading scale for cases argued
before the Supreme Court from the 1970-1994 terms. Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs
(2006) specify a logistic regression model of votes (pooled over justices, cases and terms)
where the dependent variable is coded 1 if the justice votes to reverse the lower court
decision and 0 for affirm. The votes of Justice Blackmun are excluded due to concerns
about endogeneity. A number of other control variables are included. See the original
article for their justification.
Case-Level Prediction Errors
The collective choices made by the justices on the U.S. Supreme Court are case deci-
sions. Each case is represented as a combination of justice-votes. On a typical case,
there are eight justices (excluding Blackmun) who can each either vote to affirm or re-
verse, leading to 28 = 256 possible eight-vote outcomes. The JPE analysis is performed
on the full model specified in column 2 of table 3 in Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs
(2006). In the analysis I report I used t = 5, 000 draws from the posterior predictive
distribution of the data, a posterior-predictive p-value of α = 0.10, and a prediction er-
ror size of k = 2 justice-votes.6 Figure 1.4.1 gives the four most frequent over-predicted
6I repeated the analysis with three different simulated samples, and there was no variation in the
set of prediction errors – leading me to conclude that the t = 5, 000 is sufficiently large to avoid
simulation error. Also, the substantive inferences I draw from the JPE analysis do not change for α
as small as 0.05, and there is no utility in using a less restrictive p-value. Lastly, I looked at JPEs of
size k ∈ {3, 4, 5}, but gathered no additional intuition regarding model improvement from the larger
groups.
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and under-predicted justice-vote pairs in the dataset. An under(over)-prediction is a
pair that is predicted to occur less(more) frequently than it actually does. The left
and right columns give under and over-predicted pairs respectively. Each panel is a
histogram of the number of cases in which the justice-vote pair occurs in the 5,000
datasets drawn from the original model in Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs (2006). The
number of cases in which the pair occurs in the actual dataset is located at the solid
vertical line in each panel. 7
Examining figure 1.4.1 demonstrates a clear pattern in the prediction errors. All
of the under-predicted pairs are justices in agreement. All of the over-predicted pairs
are justices not in agreement. The results presented in the figure suggest that the
original model heavily under-predicts agreement among justices in their votes on the
merits. This pattern is confirmed in the larger set of JPEs. A total of 160 JPEs are
identified. Among the 91 under-predicted pairs, 83 are pairs of justices voting in the
same direction. The remaining 69 JPEs are over-predictions, and 68 of them are justices
voting in opposite directions (i.e. one voting to reverse and one to affirm).
What these findings suggest is that the original model misses a strong degree of
positive correlation between the votes of justices on any given case. This is an omitted
feature of the data generating process that threatens the validity of inferences through
misspecification bias (White, 1982). Two classes of underlying mechanisms could be
contributing to the observed correlation. First, it is possible that overt influence or
cooperation occurs on the Court. Previous studies have found that the Court tends
towards consensus decision-making (Haynie, 1992; Epstein, Segal and Spaeth, 2001).
It could also be that omitted legal factors are producing correlation. If there are legal
facts that point every justice (or a large subset thereof) in a particular direction, the
7R package Arules Michael Hahsler and Hornik (2009) was used to perform the frequent itemset
mining. I do not replicate the model in column 1 of table 3 in Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs (2006)
because an LR test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the restrictions in the reduced model are valid.
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Figure 1.2: Joint Prediction Errors on the U.S. Supreme Court
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Note: Histograms of the number of cases in which the justice-vote pair occurs over the
5,000 datasets drawn from the model. The solid line is the times that pair occurs in
the actual data. The four most frequent under and over predictions are given in the
left and right columns respectively. The title gives the last name of the justices and
the direction of the vote (R–reverse, A–affirm).
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omission of these factors from the model would cause the under-prediction of justices
voting in a consensus manner. The dominance of the attitudinal model (Segal and
Cover, 1989; Segal and Spaeth, 1996, 2002) over the last couple decades pulled political
scientists’ explanations of decision-making on the Court away from case-level legal
factors. Yet, very recently, case-level apolitical factors have been regaining acceptance
as important predictors of the votes of Supreme Court justices (Spriggs and Hansford,
2001, 2002; Collins, 2004; Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs, 2006; Collins, 2007). The
early dominance of the attitudinal model made light of case-level idiosyncrasy (Segal
and Cover, 1989; Segal and Spaeth, 1996, 2002). Consensus prediction errors do not
constitute a statistical test for the presence of unobserved association in justices’ votes.
In order to perform a principled test of the intuitions gathered from the JPE analysis,
and asses the impact of these patterns on other inferences from the model, the model
from Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs (2006) must be improved to both test and account
for positive case-level correlation among the justices.
Case-Level Determinants of Supreme Court Votes
I extend the model in Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs (2006) in two ways to account
for the pattern discovered in the JPE analysis. First, as mentioned previously, omitted
case-level covariates could cause the observed association among the justices. Collins
(2004, 2007) shows that the Court responds to Amicus Curiae briefs. Specifically, he
shows that the probability that a particular side wins a case is directly proportional
to the number of briefs filed on its behalf and inversely proportional to the number of
briefs filed for the other side. Moreover, briefs filed by the U.S. Solicitor General have
a larger effect on the Court’s decisions than do those filed by others. I add a series of
variables to the model to account for this. The variables Appellee Amicus, Appellant
Amicus, SG Appellee Amicus and Appellant Amicus are the number of Amicus Curiae
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briefs filed on behalf of the appellee, appellant, appellee by the Solicitor General and
appellant by the solicitor general respectively. Following Collins, I expect that briefs
filed on behalf of the appellant (appellee) will have a positive (negative) effect on the
likelihood a justice votes to reverse. I also add one more case-level control to the
model; Lower Court Conflict, an indicator of whether the reason for granting certiorari
is rooted in lower court conflict. Collins (2004) finds that the Court is less likely to
reverse a decision that it hears due to lower court conflict.8 I expect this variable to
have a negative effect on the probability a justice votes for reversal.
The degree of consensus demonstrated in the JPE analysis is quite marked. It would
be overly optimistic to assume that all of the case-level association would be explained
by the covariates I add to the model. I therefore update the model to explicitly esti-
mate the residual association among the justices’ votes. A standard tool for modeling
unobserved cluster-wise association in regression models is to include a hierarchical
random-effect in the likelihood function (Gelman and Hill, 2007). It is assumed that
there is a shared disturbance to the linear predictor to for every observation in a clus-
ter. In the model implemented below, the random effect is assumed to be normally
distributed with zero mean. It is integrated out of the likelihood function, leaving only
a variance term of the random effect to be estimated. The higher the variance, the
higher the correlation between the observations in the same cluster (Caffo, An and
Rohde, 2007). Thus, the second update to the model presented in Johnson, Wahlbeck
and Spriggs (2006) is to add a case-level random effect.
The results of the hierarchical logistic regression models are presented in table 1.4.1.9
The model closest to the baseline specification that appeared in Johnson, Wahlbeck and
8The data for the added controls come from replication data for the analyses in Collins Jr (2008)
made available on Paul Collins’ website at http://www.psci.unt.edu/~pmcollins/data.htm
9R package lme4 (Bates and Sarkar, 2006) was used to estimate the models in table 1.4.1
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Table 1.1: U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ Votes on the Merits
Justice Level Case Level Case Level +
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Constant 0.280 0.067 0.556 0.214 0.78 0.24
Ideological Compatibility with Appellant 0.310+ 0.017 0.599+ 0.027 0.599+ 0.0265
Oral Argument Grade 0.205+ 0.040 0.391+ 0.141 0.400+ 0.138
Case Complexity 0.075 0.101 0.169 0.366 0.137 0.359
Oral Argument Grade × Case Complexity -0.089 0.091 -0.289 0.306 -0.252 0.301
Ideological Compatibility × Oral Argument Grade 0.020 0.016 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.025
U.S. Appellant 0.472+ 0.117 0.914+ 0.416 1.17+ 0.447
U.S. Appellee -0.790+ 0.150 -1.633+ 0.544 -1.83+ 0.553
S.G. Appellant 0.325+ 0.127 0.544 0.447 0.096 0.485
S.G. Appellee -0.208 0.167 -0.321 0.599 0.164 0.607
Washington Elite Appellant 0.406+ 0.136 0.765 0.483 0.499 0.478
Washington Elite Appellee 0.069 0.145 0.110 0.516 0.312 0.513
Law Professor Appellant -0.757+ 0.269 -1.283 0.957 -1.53 0.940
Law Professor Appellee -1.554+ 0.323 -3.007+ 1.135 -2.75+ 1.11
Clerk Appellant -0.246 0.154 -0.571 0.541 -0.490 0.531
Clerk Appellee -0.165 0.197 -0.145 0.690 -0.248 0.684
Elite Law School Appellant 0.025 0.088 0.090 0.316 0.014 0.310
Elite Law School Appellee -0.127 0.089 -0.290 0.321 -0.342 0.315
Difference in Litigating Experience -0.127+ 0.034 -0.234 0.122 -0.274+ 0.120
Appellee Amicus – – – – -0.039 0.073
Appellant Amicus – – – – -0.027 0.085
SG Appellee Amicus – – – – -1.44+ 0.559
SG Appellant Amicus – – – – 1.05+ 0.522
Lower Court Conflict – – – – -0.946+ 0.413
Justice-Level Variance 0.010 – – – – –
Case-Level Variance – – 6.88 – 6.52 –
CCVLL (No RE, RE) -2,021 -2,019 -2,064 -1,557 -2,018 -1,555
BIC 4,153 3,253 3,274
N 3,331 3,331 3,331
Clusters 16 443 443
Note: U.S. Supreme Court voting on the merits. Hierarchical logistic regression es-
timates are presented. + statistically significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed). The
CCVLL is the cluster cross-validated log-likelihood.
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Spriggs (2006) is the Justice-Level specification. Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs (2006)
use cluster-robust standard errors (Williams, 2000) with the Justice as the clustering
variable. In the case of logistic regression, this covariance estimator produces standard
error estimates that are biased downward and the estimator itself is inconsistent in
the face of unmodeled heterogeneity (Greene, 2008, p. 517; Harden, n.d.), so I use an
alternative mechanism to account for within-justice correlation. I add a justice-level
random effect to this model. This is compared to a model with a case-level random
effect.10
The pattern discovered in the joint prediction error analysis led to a specification
that greatly improves model fit, and alters many of the inferences derived from the
original model. Adding the case-level random effect to the original model reduces both
the CCVLL and BIC by almost 25%. Also there is much more unobserved heterogeneity
and/or correlation at the case-level than the justice-level. The case-level random effect
variance is estimated to be six hundred times greater than the justice-level random effect
variance. A number of independent variables that are found in the justice-level model
to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level are not significant in the case-level model.
These are all case-level variables, and include Solicitor General Appellant, Washington
Elite Appellant, Law Professor Appellant, and the Difference in Litigating Experience.
It appears that these effects were concluded to be significantly different from zero due
to specification bias. Also, three of the five variables added to the model – SG Appellee
Amicus, SG Appellant Amicus, and Lower Court Conflict – are statistically significant
in the expected direction. Evidence for the bloc of added variables is moderate in that
the CCVLL is better in the full model, but the BIC is highest in the model that is
only extended with a case-level random effect. Another important finding is that the
10I also considered a model with random effects at both the justice and case levels, but a likelihood
ratio test indicates that the justice-level random effect does not improve the model.
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coefficient on Oral Argument Grade - the variable used to test the primary theoretical
proposition in the original article - nearly doubles in size in the updated models from
0.205 to 0.391 and 0.40.
The models in table 1 can be used to predict many features of the Court data. I
examine the relative performance of the justice and case-level models through their
prediction of the size of the voting majority in a case (e.g. 9-0, 8-1, 7-2 etc.). The
ropeladder plot in figure 1.4.1 compares the predicted distribution of the size of the
majority to the distribution of the majority sizes over the 443 cases in the the actual
data. The y-axis gives the majority size, and the horizontal axes give the number of
cases out of the 443. The points represented as squares give the predictions from the
original model, and the diamonds give the predictions of the Case + model. It can
be seen that overall the case-level model provides a much better fit than the original
model, and where the improvement is most prevalent is in the tails of the distribution.
Where the case-level model accurately predicts provides accurate predictions for all of
the majority sizes, the original model does very poorly at predicting majorities of size
5, 6 and 9. Moreover, the modal case-level outcome in the data is a unanimous decision,
which occurs in 153 out of the 443 cases. The original model predicts a frequency of
unanimous decisions of fifteen. In short, there is a great deal of case-level consensus
in voting on the Court, and failure to account for this results in a biased specification
which leads to faulty inferences regarding the effect of independent variables as well as
predictions regarding case-level outcomes.
The picture of the Court discovered here is much different than that painted by the
dominant attitudinalist perspective on Court behavior, which contends that most of
the Court’s voting on the merits is driven by ideology (Segal and Spaeth, 2002). An
enormous amount of variance exists at the case-level – so much that simply adding
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Figure 1.3: U.S. Supreme Court Vote Predictions
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Note: Ropeladder plot demonstrating the fit of the models to the size of the majority in
Supreme Court cases. Points give predictions, and bars span 95% confidence intervals.
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the case-level random effect increases the log-likelihood more than all of the covari-
ates combined. The improvement suggested by the joint prediction error analysis (1)
demonstrates that case-level factors, downplayed in the attitudinal model, are indeed
important, (2) permits more reliable inferences on the effects of covariates than those
published in the original article, and (3) directs attention in the way of past findings
that have been inappropriately excluded from the model.
1.4.2 The Reliability of Democratic Allies
Examination of Original Findings
In the second replication, I examine international defense alliance fulfilment. Gartzke
and Gleditsch (2004) test whether democratic allies are more or less likely than non-
democratic allies to provide military aid to an ally that is attacked. Their hypothesis
is that democratic states, due to the domestic audience costs of military intervention
in a conflict involving an ally, are less likely to aid an ally than non-democratic states.
To test their hypothesis Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) study the participation of allies
in wars from 1816 to the present. For each war considered, all of the allies of the
participants are included in the dataset. The dependent variable is binary; coded 1
if the ally provided military aid and 0 otherwise. They specified a logistic regression
model where the main independent variable of interest is an indicator of whether or not
the ally has a democratic government (i.e. if the Polity II score is greater than 6). Other
control variables include: whether the ally is contiguous to the attacked state, whether
the ally is allied to the aggressor, and the COW composite combined capabilities score
(CINC) of both the ally and the attacked state. They find that democratic states are
less likely than non-democratic states to provide military aid to allies. It is relevant
to note that Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) assume, at least implicitly, that there is
no interdependence among those allies considering intervention into the same conflict.
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This proves to be an inappropriate assumption.
In the JPE analysis, the collective I consider is the group of states considering
intervention on the same side of a conflict. This choice is far from arbitrary. First, there
is very little in the way of conflict-specific information in the model, which would induce
correlation through unobserved war-level covariates. Examples of potentially important
factors that are omitted include whether the assets of third parties are endangered by
the conflict (Butler, 2003), the history of interventions in the conflicts of the target state
(Gleditsch and Beardsley, 2004), and the number of states involved in the conflict (Kim,
1991). Another possibility is that explicit coordination occurs among allies to states in
a given conflict. Powerful international institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) exist in part to coordinate the
military intervention activities of member states (Hartley and Sandler, 1999; Solana,
1999; Lebovic, 2004; Lango, 2005). Lastly, intervention decisions by individual states
are interdependent means to a common end – the result of the conflict. If the U.S.
intervenes on behalf of one side of a conflict, Canada may no longer need to intervene
to produce a victory for the side recieving help from the U.S.
The parameters of the JPE analysis are set at the same levels as in the Supreme
Court example: the number of draws t = 5, 000, the size of the JPE k = 2, and
the p-value α = 0.10.11 A total of 1,071 JPEs are discovered. All of them are
under-predictions, 807 of which are pairs of states making the same intervention deci-
sions. Two interesting patterns emerge. First, since approximately 80% of the under-
predictions are states in agreement, it appears the original model underestimates the
degree of correlation between states considering assistance to one side of a conflict.
A second pattern in the JPEs regards the types of states that intervene more often
11As in the Court example, deviations from these parameter values do not produce different sub-
stantive inferences.
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than are predicted and those that intervene less often. Examining the list of prediction
errors, I noticed a stark difference between two areas of the globe that are less than
completely democratic – Latin America and the Middle East. Latin American states
intervene in conflicts much less often than predicted and Middle Eastern states intervene
much more often than predicted. This is depicted in figure 1.4.2, where it is seen that
the model in Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) disproportionately underpredicts fulfilment
decisions by Middle-Eastern States, and non-fulfilment by Latin American states. In
the figure, a circle is placed at the capitol of every member in a prediction error. The
darker the color of the circle, the greater the number of intervention prediction-errors
in which that state is involved. Middle-Eastern states constitute the largest collection
of conflict-prone dark states on the map, and Latin America is a collection of conflict-
averse lighter states. This regional pattern leads to an additional hypothesis regarding
the causes of defense alliance fulfilment.
As was briefly discussed above in reference to the role of international institutions,
states often seek the approval and support of other nations when intervening in a
conflict. There is debate regarding the ability of third party consultation to mitigate
conflict in the international arena (Fisher and Keashly, 1991; Diehl, Druckman and
Wall, 1998; Wilkenfeld et al., 2003), but the argument and findings presented by Ireland
and Gartner (2001) support the hypothesis that the international consultation demands
in alliance agreements are enough to discourage states from participating in conflicts.
Ireland and Gartner (2001) argue that, in many instances, states will seek the approval
of allies before entering into a conflict. In fact, many alliance agreements include pacts
that require explicit prior consultation. In their empirical analysis of conflict initiation
by European parliamentary governments from 1922 to 1996, Ireland and Gartner (2001)
find that a consultation pact reduces the instantaneous hazard of conflict initiation by
85% – an effect that is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. States may be motivated
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to honor consultation agreements in order to create and maintain a reputation for
reliable international commitments. A state’s reputation affects inclusion in future
international activities. As Crescenzi (2007, pp. 1) observes, “In international politics,
states learn from the behavior of other nations, including the reputations states form
through their actions in the international system.” Gibler (2008) finds that states
with a reputation for upholding defense alliances are more likely to be included in
future alliances and that being allied with strong-reputation allies effectively deters
military attacks from other states. Moreover, a state can damage its reputation for
reliable international commitment by ignoring consultation obligations (Kagan, 2004;
Tucker and Hendrickson, 2004; Sandler, 2005). Given that international consultation
obligations can serve as an obstacle to states’ entry into conflict, in the context of
the current application, it would be expected that states with more consultation pacts
would be less likely to fulfil defense alliances due to consultation’s constraint on conflict
initiation. A comparison of the regional patterns in the consultation alliance network
with those in the prediction errors suggests that a state’s consultation obligation is an
important omitted variable.
Looking again at figure 1.4.2, the size of the point for each state is proportional to
the average number of consultation pacts in which it is involved for the years that it
appears in the data from Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004).12 The ATOP codebook de-
fines consultation pacts as agreements that, ”obligate members to communicate with
one another in the event of crises that have the potential to result in military con-
flict with the goal of creating a joint response.” (Leeds (2005) p.10). The states with
larger points also have lighter points, indicating that better connected states in the
consultation network are less likely than predicted by the original model to intervene
12It may seem odd to see a number of small (i.e. poorly connected) states in the heart of Western
Europe, but most of these are former German Kingdoms such as Bulgaria. These states appear in the
data during conflicts in the 19th century when consultation pacts were not common.
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on behalf of an ally. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis articulated above
– that consultation pacts serve as a hindrance to conflict participation. Given theo-
retical reasons to expect consultation obligations to matter, the apparent association
between conflict participation and consultation obligations in the JPEs suggests that
the model of alliance fulfilment should account for the connectedness of a state – the
expectation being that better-connected states will be less apt to fulfill alliance-based
conflict obligations.
Improved Models of Defense Alliance Fulfilment
I have identified two interesting regularities in the joint prediction errors. First, it
appears that the consultation obligations of an ally can inhibit the ally from entering
into a conflict. Second, there seems to be unmodeled positive correlation between the
decisions made by the allies of an attacked state. Again, we must statistically test
whether the patterns discovered in the joint prediction error analysis truly exist in the
data generally, and whether accounting for them improves the specification of Gartzke
and Gleditsch (2004). To test whether consultation obligations reduce the likelihood
of alliance fulfilment, I add a variable to the model (Consultation Degree) which is the
number of states with which the ally has consultation pacts in year t. If state A must
decide whether to intervene into a conflict in year t, Consultation Degree is the number
of states with which state A has consultation pacts in year t. To account for correlation
among states that are allied to the same state I add a target-conflict random effect to
the model, where the target is the state being potentially assisted in the alliance and
the conflict is a specific instance of war. Table 1.4.2 presents the results with various
specifications that include the improvements identified in the JPE analysis.
The results support the inferences suggested in the JPE analysis. In terms of the
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first pattern discovered in the JPE analysis, there is a high degree of association be-
tween the decisions rendered by states in the same target-conflict group. The addition
of a target-conflict random effect improves model fit considerably. Over all three of
the covariate specifications, the addition of the target-conflict random effect improves
the BIC and CCVLL by 20-30 points. The suspicion that consultation obligation is an
important omitted variable is also confirmed by the results. Consultation Degree is a
statistically significant negative determinant of the probability of alliance fulfilment in
all of the different specifications. Accounting for this relationship moves the specifica-
tion closer to the true data generating process, as evidenced by the CCVLL. Overall,
the contributions suggested by the JPE analysis improved the explanation of states’
decisions to fulfil defense alliance obligations.
Another result from the improved specification is that the democracy indicator
is no longer statistically significant. Simply adding the random effect to the model
eliminates the statistical significance of the democracy indicator. In fact, the best
fitting model, according to both the BIC and CCVLL, is the one where a random effect
and Consultation Degree is included and the democracy indicator is constrained to
have no effect. By improving the model specification, I have shown that the previous
inference that democratic states are less likely to fulfil defense alliances is attributable
to misspecification bias, and not an actual effect.
1.5 Conclusion
Political scientists have learned much from the study of repeated collective choice pro-
cesses, where stable sets of well-known actors repeatedly issue individual decisions that
have broad collective implications. A cornerstone of theory regarding repeated, salient
interaction is that the actors involved equilibrate to sophisticated and highly interde-
pendent choice strategies. Many contexts of repeated collective choice – roll-call voting
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in legislatures, decisions on the merits in multi-member courts of appeal, and interven-
tion by nations into conflicts or other emergency events – are characterized by a body
of individual actors making micro-level decisions that are aggregated into macro-level
outcomes with far-reaching consequences (e.g. law, the interpretation of the law, and
the results of conflicts). Since these collective interactions are repeated many times
throughout history, an expectation of stable and sophisticated patterns of interdepen-
dence among the micro-level decisions is strongly justified. This poses a challenge to the
statistical analysis of micro-level decisions in repeated collective choice data. Namely,
if patterns of interdependence are a strong component of the data generating process,
common parametric models that are used to analyze this sort of data, such as logistic
regression, are misspecified and inferences regarding micro and macro-level factors that
drive micro-level choices are suspect due to misspecification bias.
In order to make valid statistical inferences with repeated collective choice data, the
model specification must account for the forms of interdependence that characterize the
data generating process. It can be incredibly burdensome in terms of both computation
and interpretation to specify and estimate a model that is robust to any conceivable
form of multivariate dependence among discrete choices. I propose a solution to the
problem of interdependence in repeated collective choice data that takes advantage
of the wealth of knowledge political scientists hold regarding the observations (e.g.
legislators, justices or countries) that is above and beyond that contained in the dataset.
I propose that researchers estimate a simple model to start – that which represents the
best theoretical specification that can be managed – then examine forms of multivariate
deficiency, and iteratively improve the specification to include components hypothesized
to account for the model’s failures. Specifically, I introduce the joint prediction error,
a collective outcome that is poorly predicted by a model, as a tool for discovering
unmodeled forms of interdependence. Theoretical examination of commonalities among
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and individual characteristics of the membership and actions in these JPEs suggests
substantive improvements to the specified model. Additionally, I suggest the use of the
cross-validated loglikelihood, an unbiased metric of proximity to the true model, as a
tool for judging the validity of the improvements derived from the analysis of JPEs. In
two empirical applications I demonstrate the utility of the iterative model improvement
procedure I propose. In the JPE analysis of the model from Johnson, Wahlbeck and
Spriggs (2006) it is found that there is a very strong unmodeled tendency towards
consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court. This is in contrast with a strictly political view
of the Court. Updating the model to account for case-level positive correlation among
the votes of the justices strongly improves the fit. Moreover, many inferences made in
the original paper are shown to result from specification error. The second replication
considers an analysis by Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) of the likelihood that states fulfil
defense alliances. The JPE analysis identifies correlation between states considering
intervention on the same side of a conflict. Also, prediction errors are consistent with
the importance of states’ consultation obligations, which is omitted from the original
specification. Both of the patterns in the JPEs lead to improvements in the empirical
model.
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Chapter 2
The Exponential Random
Configuration Model
2.1 Introduction
Important processes in every field of empirical political science arise in the form of
repeated collective decisions. Roll-call votes in legislatures and decisions issued by
multi-member courts of appeal are comprised of individual decisions issued by a stable
group of actors that are aggregated into politically relevant collective outcomes. In
the international arena, intervention into civil wars, the provision of relief for natural
disasters, and the issuance of trade sanctions are interdependent decisions rendered
repeatedly by a stable group of states. The outcomes produced by many forms of
collective political decision-making – laws written, laws interpreted, or the result of
wars – are typically high-stakes. Additionally, the individual decision-makers have
multiple opportunities to learn optimal strategies for interaction. This combination
of important results and repeated interaction provides respectively the motive and
opportunity for actors to develop complex and sophisticated interactive strategies. As
a result, patterns of interdependence are likely to emerge in repeated collective choice
data. Many scholars have noted that patterns of sophisticated rational interaction are
likely to exist when the stakes of the interaction are high enough to induce careful
cognitive effort, and the collective choice situation is repeated many times – providing
actors with the motive and opportunity to learn the rules and payoffs of the game (see
e.g. Verba (1961) and Ostrom (1998)).
The dependence among the individual decisions in repeated collective choices is
just as critical to an accurate theoretical account of the process under study as the
dependence of those decisions on exogenous covariates. Indeed, many well-known ex-
planations of political phenomena directly imply interdependence in repeated collective
choice. Theories of party leadership (Hix, 2002) imply that the roll call votes of leg-
islators will depend upon those of their party leaders, accounts of acclamation on the
U.S. Supreme Court (Dorff and Brenner, 1992) imply that freshman justices’ votes
will correlate strongly with those of their colleagues, and in the study of international
conflict it is theorized that states are not likely to fight the enemies of their enemies
(Maoz et al., 2006) (i.e. the choice of state A to fight state B, if state A is at war
with C, depends on whether B is at war with C). However, in practice analysts often
pool the members of the stable group into a sample for regression modeling where
relationships between the members are ignored to the extent that they are not repre-
sented by independent variables. This causes two related problems. First, theories of
interdependence are excluded from models of individual decision-making – leading to
a substantively unrealistic account of the process. This, in turn, leads to the second
problem – misspecification bias, where inference on the effects of exogenous covariates
are possibly invalid due to incorrect model specification.
In many instances of repeated collective decision making, the politically relevant
collective outcome (e.g. the result of a court case or the passage of legislation) is a
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deterministic function of the individual decisions rendered by the members of decision-
making body (e.g. a lower court decision is reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court if five
or more justices vote with the appellant). Because of this deterministic relationship
between micro and macro-level outcomes, if a model is fit to the individual decisions
that comprise the collective outcome, one is automatically implied for the collective
outcome.1 For instance, if a model is fit to U.S. Supreme Court Justice voting on
the merits – estimating the probability that a justice will vote with the appellant in a
case – the probability that the Court decides in favor of the appellant is given by the
sum of the joint probabilities of all nine-justice configurations in which at least five vote
with the appellant. It is inconsistent to specify separate statistical models for individual
decisions and combinations of individual decisions(e.g. the proportion voting yea) – the
the former implies the latter. The critical implication of the micro-macro connection is
that, in order to be correctly specified, the micro-level model must capture any tendency
for individual decisions to produce sophisticated/intentional combinations of decisions.
My contributions in this work are three-fold. First, I propose a statistical model,
the exponential random configuration model (ERCM), that can be used to account
for and test hypotheses regarding virtually any form of interdependence in collective
discrete choice data. The model also permits individual decisions to depend upon
exogenous covariates in the exact same way as in a logistic regression model. Indeed, in
the case where interdependence does not exist, the effects of configurational terms on
the probability of observing any particular collective decision go to zero and the model
reduces to logistic regression. Second, I describe a useful configurational approach to
theorizing about the data generating process in collective choice that facilitates the
integration of individual covariate and collective interdependence theories into a single
1In making this statement I assume that the model is fit within either the likelihood or Bayesian
estimation frameworks, or any other method used to fit a full parametric distribution to the data.
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framework. Third, I present a semi-parametric, predictive measure of model fit that
can be used to select between any two statistical models of dichotomous collective
choice. To illustrate the applicability of these contributions, I replicate and extend
a model of U.S. Supreme Court justices’ votes on the merits (Richards and Kritzer,
2002) – demonstrating how the ERCM can be used to account for well-known case-
level dynamics while modeling the individual choices of the justices.
2.2 Theorizing About Discrete Configurations
An approach to theorizing about collective choice outcomes that unifies theories of indi-
vidual behavioral motivations (i.e. covariate effects) and those that posit the relevance
of particular combinations of decisions will facilitate the construction of comprehen-
sive empirical models using the ERCM. When modeling the individual decisions that
constitute an instance of collective choice, two ways to state the scientific task at hand
are (1) to explain each of the individual decisions within the instance of the collective
choice and (2) to explain why the collective decision unfolded in the way it did with-
out aggregating the votes in any way (i.e. to explain why we observed the particular
configuration of votes on hand). Task (2) nests task (1) as a necessary component. In
order to explain why a vote unfolded in a particular manner it is critical to account for
any individual (i.e. exogenously determined) motivations of the decision-makers. Task
(2) orients the theorist towards higher-level explanations of the collective outcome –
focusing on relevant combinations of decisions. In an instance of roll-call voting, such
higher-level or configurational explanations might include a recognition that a high
degree of party discipline characterized the vote, legislators took cues from, and thus
voted with, noted policy experts on the subject matter of the bill under consideration,
and legislators X, Y and Z voted with other legislators who typically vote for legislation
sponsored by X, Y and Z (i.e. vote-trading).
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When theories involve joint outcomes, where the decisions of one actor depend
upon those of others within the same instance of collective choice, hypotheses derived
from these theories cannot be accommodated in the conventional discrete choice re-
gression modeling framework. Probabilistic inferences using logit or probit require the
assumption that the individual outcomes which constitute the dependent variable are
independent and identically distributed conditional upon the covariates (i.i.d.). Enter-
ing one or more of the choices as an independent variable for another choice renders the
outcomes dependent upon each other by construction - violating the i.i.d. assumption.2
It is true that hierarchical/multilevel models, as described by Gelman and Hill
(2007), allow for dependence between the individual decisions, but the form of the
dependence is quite limited. In a multilevel model, individual observations within
groups are interdependent insofar as they share the value of some unobserved contextual
independent variable that adds a shared within-group disturbance to one of the model
parameters (e.g. intercept, regression coefficient, variance etc.). A hierarchical model,
for instance, could not accommodate the sort of interdependence that might arise due
to cue-taking in a legislature – where the interdependence cannot be represented by
cutting the observations into separate groups.
Configurational theory is not new to political science, but testing and accounting
for configurational hypotheses in micro-level decision models is. When exploring con-
figurational hypotheses it is common for political scientists to identify aggregations
and/or transformations of the micro-level data that render it suitable for testing their
particular configurational theories. There are a number of examples of this in studies
of the U.S. Supreme Court. Johnson, Spriggs and Wahlbeck (2005) provide support
2It is important to note that this is not always the case. If the sequence of decision-making is
known, later decisions only depend upon those made earlier in the sequence (e.g. there is no reaction
to anticipated decisions), then a Markov assumption is justified (Ware, Lipsitz and Speizer, 1988) and
later decisions can be made dependent upon earlier decisions in a logit or probit.
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for their hypothesis that the chief justice will vote with the majority by demonstrating
that the chief chooses to pass when it becomes his or her turn to vote in conference
– observing which side will win, then voting with the majority. In a study of confor-
mity voting on the Court, Epstein, Segal and Spaeth (2001) show that justices tend
to change their votes in the direction of the original conference majority when issuing
their final vote on the merits in cases. An area in political science that relies heavily
upon aggregation of collective decision-making data is that on parties in legislatures.
Many configurational theories regarding party cohesion and the effect of party lead-
ers in legislatures have been tested by aggregating outcomes in ways so as to directly
measure the form of association under study (e.g. party cohesion, polarization, and
discipline scores). Specifically, past studies have examined the determinants of varia-
tion in partisan polarization and party discipline in legislatures (Rohde, 1991; Aldrich
and Battista, 2002; Hix, 2002). In every field of political science that regularly studies
collective choice, configurational theory has been developed, and tests of these theories
are regularly defined on careful manipulations or aggregations of micro-level data.
Though one might identify a satisfactory manipulation of the data that permits an
effective test of a configurational theory, this does not help the analyst that needs to
account for configurational tendencies in the study of micro-level decisions. Virtually
any support for configurational theories found by manipulating micro-level data con-
stitutes evidence that these theories need to be accommodated in models of micro-level
decisions. In the next section I propose the Exponential Random Configuration Model
(ERCM), a statistical model that can be used to seamlessly integrate configurational
theory into models of micro-level behavior.
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2.3 A General Model for Discrete Configurations
The exponential random configuration model (ERCM), which I define in the current
section, can be used to model collective choice, accounting for and testing the effect of
any theoretically plausible form of interdependence among the decisions. This model
is derived from an incredibly flexible exponential family discrete multivariate proba-
bility distribution that has been used in areas as diverse as social network analysis in
the form of the exponential random graph model (ERGM) (Wasserman and Pattison,
1996), natural language processing in the form of conditional random fields (Altun,
Smola and Hofmann, 2004), the energy in microstates of discrete systems in physics
(Shirts and Shirts, 2002), and modeling the spatial distribution of plant infections in
the form of lattice systems (Besag, 1974).3 The exponential family of multivariate dis-
tributions used to derive the ERCM has seen such wide application due to its ability to
accommodate any form of measurable interdependence among the individual compo-
nents in the grouping under study – whether that grouping is a set of relationships in
a social group, words on a document, or particles in a physical system. In the current
section I make the case for adding to this list collective decision outcomes in politics.
The key step in using the ERCM is to approach each collective decision as a single
observation with multiple components – rather than a number of choices that are inde-
pendent conditional on the covariates. The ERCM takes as inputs measures defined on
the collective decision that the researcher believes effect the likelihood of a particular in-
stance of collective choice being observed. These measures are identified by the analyst
to capture combinations of decisions that are implied to be more or less likely by their
configurational theories. For instance, if a theory implies that a decision-making body
3In terms of other treatments of this distributional form, the literature on the ERGM is likely the
most familiar and/or accessible to political scientists. See Holland and Leinhardt (1981); Wasserman
and Pattison (1996); Goodreau (2007) and Robins (2009) for additional reading on the ERGM.
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tends toward consensus, the measure could be the size of the majority coalition, hypoth-
esizing that within a consensus-building institution the size of the majority coalition
will have a positive effect on the likelihood of observing an instance of collective choice.
These measures are operationalizations of the configurational hypotheses reviewed in
the previous section.
In the remainder of this section I derive the ERCM in full. First, I describe in detail
the process of operationalizing configurational hypotheses, including a characterization
of conventional additive covariate effects as configurational hypotheses. Next I describe
how configurational measures defined on the collective choice outcome can be used
to form a distribution over all possible collective outcomes. Then I show how the
parameters in the ERCM can be used to interpret the effect of configurational measures
on the likelihood of observing any particular instance of collective choice. After deriving
the model and discussing interpretation, I describe alternative methods for estimating
the parameters of the ERCM. Last, I provide a model-fit measure that can be used to
compare differently parametrized ERCMs.
2.3.1 Measurement and Configurational Hypotheses
Configurational hypotheses imply the prevalence of certain combinations of choices in
instances of collective decision-making. An alternative way to state this is that config-
urational hypotheses state the effect of observing a particular combination of decisions
within a collective choice on the likelihood of observing that instance of collective choice.
For example, if the configurational theory claims that party leadership is important in
the U.S. House, a hypothesis derived from this theory could be that we are more likely
to observe roll-call outcomes where more than 50% of majority party members vote
with the Speaker of the House than we are to observe roll-calls in which more than 50%
vote with the minority leader. The first step in testing a configurational hypothesis
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is to define the measurement(s) that can be computed on a collective choice outcome
that best capture the process implied by the configurational theory. The inputs to the
ERCM are finite, scalar-valued statistics defined on the binary decisions that constitute
the collective choice. In the same way that the researcher defines the appropriate oper-
ationalizations of the independent variables to be included in the model, these statistics
are also designed by the researcher to measure features of the collective choice that vary
in a systematic way according to the configurational hypotheses. To continue with the
example of party leadership, this statistic may be the proportion of legislators that vote
with their party leaders. The ERCM is designed to assess the effect of these statistics
on the likelihood of observing any particular instance of the collective decision. The
fully operationalized configurational hypothesis regarding party leadership would be
that the likelihood of observing a particular instance of roll-call voting increases as
the proportion of members voting with their party leaders in that particular instance
increases. Equivalently, it could be stated that, given a vote is taken, we are more
likely to observe an outcome where the proportion of members voting with their party
leaders is high than one in which the proportion of members voting with their party
leaders is low.
Let y be a binary collective decision issued by n actors (i.e. a vector of n zeros and
ones), and Γ(y) be a function/statistic defined on y that evaluates to a real number that
is finite, and there is varies in value over the possible configurations of y. Suppose there
are k configurational hypotheses implied by an analyst’s theory of collective decision-
making. The statistic Γi(y), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} should be specified such that if the ith
hypothesis is accurate, the likelihood of observing a particular instance of y varies
predictably with Γi(y). Using again the example of the count of legislators voting
with their party leaders, a hypothesis of strong party leadership would imply that the
likelihood of observing an instance of y increases as the proportion of legislators voting
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with their party leaders in that instance of y increases (i.e. we are more likely to observe
a roll-call in which 50% of legislators vote with their party leaders than one in which
30% of legislators vote with party leaders). An alternative way to state this expectation
is that we are more likely to observe instances of y where many legislators vote with
their party leaders. Particular specifications of Γ(y) derive from theories of collective
choice in the same way as the operationalization of covariates in conventional regression
modeling. In the same way a researcher might search for the best possible indicator
of the ideology of legislators, in order to operationalize a hypothesis regarding cue-
taking, the researcher should identify what measure can be computed on roll-call votes
that would provide the clearest evidence of cue-taking – this measure should become
Γcue−taking(y). The innovation available in ERCM modeling is to adjust inferences
regarding the presence of cue-taking for other factors that might produce a particular
value of Γcue−taking(y).
The regression framework represents the dominant approach to the statistical anal-
ysis of discrete choice in political science. It is therefore important to show how Γ(y)
can be specified to capture the same relationships in the data that are tested in a regres-
sion model. Let x be an n element exogenous covariate where the jth, {j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , n}
element of x corresponds to the jth individual choice in y, then accounting for the
additive effect of x on the individual components of y in constructing the likelihood of
observing a particular instance of y is accomplished with
Γx(y) =
[
n∑
i=1
yixi
]
. (2.1)
A hypothesis that x will have a positive effect on y, in a discrete-choice regression
framework, is stated as an expectation that the probability that y = 1 will increase
as x increases. In configurational form, this is equivalent to the expectation that the
ones in y will align with higher values in x. Γx(y) will be higher if the ones in y
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correspond to the higher values in x. If x is expected to have a positive effect on y,
this, again, can be stated in configurational form as an expectation that the likelihood
of observing a particular instance of y increases with the degree to which the ones in y
align with the higher values in x. By using statistics in the form given in equation 2.1,
the analyst can test the usual covariate-effect hypotheses alongside theories of complex
interdependence in discrete choice.
I claim that, in order to test configurational hypotheses, the analyst must define
measurements on the collective outcome that help explain the way in which the col-
lective decision unfolded. It may appear, at first glance, like these could constitute
second-level covariates in a multilevel model where individual choices are nested in col-
lective decisions. There is a fundamental problem with this approach. Since Γ(y) is
itself a measurement/function defined on the collective outcome, it is, by construction,
endogenous to the collective outcome that would constitute the dependent variable in
such a multilevel model. Putting Γ(y) on the right-hand-side of a hierarchical model of
y would amount to explaining y with a function of y. Having identified the Γ(y)s that
are believed to be relevant to the probability of observing a particular instance of y, I
have yet to define how the relevance and overall effects of the Γ(y)s can be estimated
within a principled inferential framework.
2.3.2 A Distribution Over Discrete Configurations
In this section I introduce a multivariate distribution that is permits the estimation
of the effect of Γ(y) on the likelihood of observing y to be computed without making
the blatantly incorrect assumption that Γ(y) is exogenous to y – thus completing the
derivation of the ERCM. Let Γ(y) be the vector of k statistics hypothesized to effect
the likelihood of observing y. In order to make inference on the effects of the statistics
of interest, Γ(y) must be integrated into a proper probability distribution defined on
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possible configurations of y along with parameters that can be estimated and provide
an interpretation the effect of Γ(y). Denote the vector of effect parameters θ, and
the linear configuration predictor θ′Γ(y). The θ give the magnitude and direction
of the effect of Γ(y) on the likelihood of observing y. If θj is positive (negative),
then as Γj(y) increases, the likelihood of observing y increases (decreases). A relative
probability weight for any particular configuration is given as
ω(y) = exp{θ′Γ(y)}. (2.2)
This defines a non-negative weight for any observed collective choice. Thus, the prob-
ability of observing a particular configuration y is proportional to ω(y). A proper
probability distribution for y is then defined by dividing ω(y) by the sum of all weights
for all possible configurations of the collective decision –
P (y) =
ω(y)∑
∀y∈Y ω(y)
=
exp{θ′Γ(y)}∑
∀y∈Y exp{θ′Γ(y)}
. (2.3)
The probability distribution given in equation 2.3 permits statistical inference within
the Bayesian or likelihood frameworks. Suppose the data under study contains T
collective choices (e.g. roll-calls or court cases), then the likelihood function defined on
the entire set of collective decisions is given as
l(y1,y2, . . . ,yT |θ) =
T∏
t=1
ω(yt)∑
∀y∈Y t ω(y)
, (2.4)
where Y t is the set of all possible configurations of binary decisions that could have
been observed in the tth collective decision.4
At first glance the ERCM might seem quite different from logistic regression, the
4For an alternative derivation of this distribution – one oriented towards the modeling of a single
social network – see Park, Gelman and Bafumi (2004).
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modal method for the study of discrete choice in political science and elsewhere, but
there is a subtle commonality. If none of the higher-order (i.e. endogenous) Γ(y)s
have an effect on P (y), and only those statistics that account for exogenous covariates
entered in the form of equation 2.1 matter, then the ERCM reduces to logistic regression
on the discrete choices that compose the collective decisions, and the θ are exactly
equivalent to the coefficients from logistic regression.5 I prove this in the final section
of this chapter. This property establishes a seamless relationship between the ERCM
and discrete choice modeling with logistic regression. Since logit is nested in the ERCM,
a likelihood ratio test can be used to assess whether a significant improvement in model
fit is achieved by moving from the familiar logit framework to the more complicated
ERCM.
2.3.3 Interpretation of the ERCM
Unlike the regression approach to modeling, where the outcome of interest is the mean
or expected value of the dependent variable, the quantity that is directly modeled in
the ERCM is the probability of observing any particular configuration of the collec-
tive decision. This probability depends flexibly upon characteristics of the collective
outcome that can include indicators or counts of theoretically relevant combinations of
choices, the alignment of choices with exogenous covariates, or interactions between the
two. The parameter θj can be used to derive the proportional change in the probability
of observing y given a change in Γj(y). Consider two potential configurations y1 and
y2 where Γj(y1) − Γj(y2) = δ, δ 6= 0 and Γi(y1) = Γi(y2) ∀i 6= j, meaning y1 and
y2 differ by some non-zero quantity δ on the j
th statistic and are equal on all other
5I am not the first to note this property of models parametrized in the form of the ERCM. In the
context of the ERGM for social networks, see Faust and Skvoretz (2002) and Goodreau, Kitts and
Morris (2009) for other works that discuss the logistic regression as a special case.
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statistics. The ratio of the probability of observing y1 to that of observing y2 is
exp{θ′Γ(y1)}P
∀y∈Y exp{θ′Γ(y)}
exp{θ′Γ(y)}P
∀y2∈Y exp{θ
′Γ(y)}
=
exp{θ′Γ(y1)}
exp{θ′Γ(y2)}
=
exp{θ1Γ1(y1)}, . . . , exp{θjΓj(y1)}, . . . , exp{θkΓk(y1)}
exp{θ1Γ1(y2)}, . . . , exp{θjΓj(y2)}, . . . , exp{θkΓk(y2)} =
exp{θjΓj(y1)}
exp{θjΓj(y2)}
=
exp{θj [Γj(y2) + δ]}
exp{θjΓj(y2)} = exp{θjδ}.
Thus, the multiplicative effect of a change in Γj(y) (i.e. δ) on P (y) is exp{θjδ}. To
give some substance to this interpretation, I revert to the hypothetical example of
party leadership in a legislature. If Γj(y) is the number of partisans voting with their
party leaders, consider again two possible configurations of the vote y1 and y2, and
assume that Γj(y1) is 51, Γj(y2) is 50 (i.e. δ = 1), and θj = 0.0953. Then
P (y1)
P (y2)
is
exp{0.0953× 1} = 1.1 – the probability of observing y1 is approximately 1.1 times the
probability of observing y2 – a difference of 10% attributable to the greater degree of
agreement with party leaders in y1.
Though the ERCM is parametrized to directly model the probability of a particular
instance of collective choice, researchers may be interested in other quantities such
as the expected value of one individual’s decision, the expected correlation between
any two individuals, or the uncertainty (i.e. variance) surrounding the prediction of
an individual’s decision. The estimates of the ERCM can be used to predict any
of these quantities. Since a full parametric distribution is defined over the collective
decision, the parameters can be used to study and predict any quantity of interest
that can be computed on a collective decision. A Monte Carlo method that has been
developed for the interpretation of ERGMs applied to social networks will prove useful
in the interpretation of ERCMs (see e.g. Hunter et al. (2008) and Goodreau, Kitts and
Morris (2009)). First, a large number of collective outcomes are simulated from the
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distribution implied by the model estimates. Then quantities of interest are computed
on the simulated outcomes – constituting an empirical approximation to the theoretical
distribution of the quantity of interest. This theoretical distribution is not generally
available due to its dependence on the form of the Γ(·)s, which will vary based on
the substantive application, and other computational challenges discussed below. An
example of using this approach to interpretation would be to compute the model-based
distribution of the number of consensus votes in a legislative session. 6
2.3.4 Estimation of the ERCM
The theoretical complexity accounted for in the ERCM comes at the cost of occasional
computational challenges in estimation.. In theory, since the ERCM is a fully para-
metric exponential family distribution (van Duijn, Gile and Handcock, 2009), Newton-
Raphson type hill-climbing algorithms can be used for parameter estimation by maxi-
mum likelihood – the same method typically used to estimate parameters in the general-
ized linear model (i.e. logit, probit, Poisson regression etc.) (Haberman and Renshaw,
1996). However, in practice, the analytic value of the log-likelihood function often
cannot be computed within a reasonable time-frame. Recall from equation 2.3 that
calculating the likelihood for any one collective decision requires the summation of
ω(y) over all possible realizations of y to compute the denominator. The number of
realizations is 2n, where n is the number of actors in the decision-making body. When
n is of moderate size, say a nine-member court, meaning there are 512 possible realiza-
tions of a collective decision (i.e. the vote on a case) then the likelihood function can be
6Note that this approach to model/statistical interpretation is equivalent to the method advocated
by King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000) and implemented in Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg and King,
2003), the STATA add-on that is very popular in political science.
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computed exactly within a reasonable time frame.7 In larger scale applications, exact
computation of the likelihood function would take years or lifetimes. For example, a
roll-call vote among the 100 U.S. Senators can arise in 1.27 nonillion (i.e. 1030) unique
configurations. Since the distributional forms and estimation challenges between the
ERCM and the ERGM are equivalent, I review methods of approximate inference that
have been applied to the ERGM, which can also be used to estimate the ERCM. The
current review draws heavily from Desmarais and Cranmer (N.d.).
If the size of the decision-making body is too large, rendering maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE) infeasible, there are two popular methods of approximation available
– maximum pseudolikelihood (MPLE) (Frank and Strauss, 1986) and Markov Chain
Monte Carlo maximum likelihood (MCMC-MLE) (Geyer and Thompson, 1992). The
MCMC-MLE algorithm uses a large random sample of collective outcomes from the
distribution of possible outcomes to approximate the large sum in the denominator
of the likelihood function. This approximate likelihood function is maximized to find
parameter estimates. The covariance matrix of the estimates computed as the inverse
of the negative Hessian of the final approximate log-likelihood function. Pseudocode
for the MCMC-MLE algorithm for the ERCM is given in figure 2.3.4.
Instead of using random sampling, the maximum pseodolikelihood estimator uses an
analytic approximation to the likelihood function. In the MPLE, the joint likelihood of
the individual choices that compose the collective decision is replaced with the product
over the conditional probability of each decision given the other decisions in the instance
of collective choice. That is, for a given actor in collective t, the conditional probability
of a one, a moderate adaptation of the conditional probability of an edge in an ERGM
7It is impossible to arrive at exact figures for what does or does not constitute “moderate” since
such a distinction depends completely on the computer technology being used, but anything over 15
(32,768 possible collective outcomes) would pose a formidable challenge for any high-end contemporary
desktop.
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Figure 2.1: MCMC-MLE Estimation Algorithm
m = number of simulated collective decisions used to approximate likelihood
α = threshold for stopping iterative optimization
θ = parameter vector
∆ll = change in log-likelihood
o = indicator for the observed network
LL = log-likelihood
Initialize ∆ll to ∞
Initialize LL to −∞
Initialize θ to starting values
while(∆ll > α){
1.
for(∀ i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , T ){
Draw and store m collective choices from the ith distribution
parametrized with θ
}
2. Using a hill-climbing algorithm, find θ∗ to maximize
LL∗ =
∑T
t=1 log
[
ω(yt)Pm
j=1 ω(yj)
]
3. Store θ = θ∗
4. Store ∆ll = LL
∗ − LL
5. Store LL = LL∗
}
θ is now the MCMC-MLE
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provided in (Goodreau, Kitts and Morris, 2009), is given by
Pr(yti = 1|yt−i,θ) = logit−1 [θ′∆i(Γ(y))] . (2.5)
The expression ∆i(Γ(y)) is the vector of change statistics – the change in the vector
of Γ(y)s when yi is toggled from 0 to 1, holding the rest of y constant at the observed
values. It turns out that the conditional probabilities can be computed very quickly
since the summation in the denominator does not factor into the conditional likelihoods.
The maximum pseudolikelihood is computed by using a hill-climbing algorithm to find
the vector of parameters that maximize
log
(
T∏
t=1
nt∏
i=1
Pr(yti = 1|yt−i,θ)y
t
i (1− Pr(yti = 1|yt−i,θ))1−y
t
i
)
This is very convenient in that it can be computed using standard logistic regression
software, with the change statistics composing the matrix of independent variables.
Conventionally, as with the MCMC-MLE method, an approximate covariance matrix
for the maximum pseudolikelihood is formed by inverting the observed information
matrix (i.e. the standard covariance matrix derived from the logistic regression software
used to compute the MPLE). Desmarais and Cranmer (N.d.) propose an alternative
method for computing the covariance matrix with the pseudolikelihood that does not
rely on the use of the parametric covariance matrix from logistic regression. Similar to
the hierarchical bootstrap methods presented by Field and Welsh (2007) and Harden
(Forthcoming), Desmarais and Cranmer (N.d.) suggest the bootstrap resampling of
conditionally/Markov independent units.8 In their application the units are networks;
in the current application they are collective choices. Though individual decisions
8Markov independence implies that collective outcomes can depend upon previous outcomes (e.g.
Court decisions could depend upon precedent).
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within instances are not independent and thus cannot be bootstrapped, the T collective
decisions are independent and can be resampled.
The choice of which estimator to use is straightforward only if the decision-making
body is small. In this instance, analytic maximum likelihood estimation is compu-
tationally feasible and should be used. If MLE is infeasible, either MCMC-MLE or
MPLE can be used. MPLE represents a more conservative choice in that it is less
efficient than MCMC-MLE (van Duijn, Gile and Handcock, 2009), but the confidence
intervals derived from the clustered bootstrap exhibit good coverage properties. Little
is known regarding the scalability of MCMC-MLE (e.g. should the number of draws
used to approximate the denominator increase with the size of the decision-making
body?). If MCMC-MLE is computationally feasible, it is advisable to try a few order-
of-magnitude different number of draws in the approximation (e.g. 1,000 - 10,000 -
100,000), and rerun the model a few times using different seeds to the random number
generator. If there is no substantively meaningful simulation variance in the estimates,
the MCMC-MLE is probably the best choice. Studies have found the MPLE to be un-
biased (van Duijn, Gile and Handcock, 2009; Desmarais and Cranmer, N.d.), and it is
computationally stable in that it does not rely upon simulation. The MPLE combined
with bootstrapped covariance estimates is a robust and fast alternative in demanding
settings where large decision-making bodies are under study and/or the MCMC-MLE
shows signs of instability.
2.3.5 Predictive, Semi-Parametric Fit Comparison of ERCMs
The ERCM is a flexible tool that permits complicated interactive theories to be seam-
lessly accommodated in models of collective choice. Inevitably, the analyst needs to
decide what level of complexity best characterizes the data on-hand. It is critical to
assure that the overlapping complexities in the ERCM specification are not combining
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to explain and falsely attribute structure to pure and possibly outlying noise in the
data. This is not a straightforward task for two reasons. First, whereas many methods
for detecting outliers in conventional regression analyses have been developed, it is not
apparent that any techniques have been designed to test for outlying configurations.
Second, since many practical applications will require the use of either MCMC-MLE
or pseudolikelihood approximations to the MLE, it is unclear what conventional mea-
sures of model fit such as AIC or BIC would mean since they would themselves be
approximations and would not be based on the MLE. In this section I describe an ap-
proach to model fit assessment that penalizes over-fit models and is agnostic regarding
the criterion (e.g. MLE, MCMC-MLE, pseudolikelihood etc.) used to estimate the
parameters.
As I alluded to above, a measure of model fit designed for comparison of ERCMs
should satisfy three criteria. First, since using ERCMs involves the addition of model
complexity to the standard regression framework, it is desirable that the fit metric
consciously avoid over-fitting the data – favoring a parsimonious specification. Second,
since it will often be impossible to be confident that the ERCM estimates are equivalent
to the MLE, the fit measure should be able to determine the relative performance of
two models independent of the estimation procedure. Third, the fit metric should
be appropriate for the comparison of non-nested models. Such a measure could be
used to compare among arbitrarily different ERCMs fit to the same data or between
alternative models and ERCMs, and the validity of said comparison would not depend
on the estimation procedure.
The cross-validated F-measure (CVFM) of classification performance proposed by
Forman and Scholz (2009) meets the three criteria presented above. Leave-k out Cross-
validation is a general procedure for judging the performance of an empirical model
through out-of-sample predictive fit that efficiently uses the data (Kohavi, 1995; Ward,
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Siverson and Cao, 2007). It is similar in structure to the computation of Cook’s D –
the outlier identification statistic commonly used in regression modeling (Cook, 1977).
Given some measure of the model’s fit to the observations in y (e.g. R2, proportional
reduction in error, BIC etc.) denoted Λ(y), cross-validation works by computing Λ(yi)
on each observation using the parameters estimated with the data excluding the ith
observation. If the observations are clustered into groups (i.e. individual choices in
collective decisions), the i indexes groups instead of observations (Price, Nero and Gel-
man, 1996). Thus, every observation is used to estimate (i.e. influence) the parameters
and to evaluate the fit of the model, but never at the same time. If a procedure that
over-fits the data can be characterized as favoring a more complex model than the
true one that generated the data, Jensen and Cohen (2000) prove that cross-validation
effectively avoids over-fitting in the context of comparing multiple models.
The selection of Λ(y) is critical to the performance of cross-validation. Forman and
Scholz (2009) compare many candidate measures in the context of leave-k-out cross-
validation with binary outcomes (e.g. binary votes in collective decisions). They find
that the F-measure, computed precisely in the manner reviewed below, is unbiased and
performs well at selecting the right model using cross-validation. The F-Measure is
designed to balance the concepts of precision and recall in the classification of binary
outcomes. Precision is defined as the number of true positives divided by the total
number of positive predictions – a measure of a model’s ability to discriminate between
zeros and ones. Recall is defined as the number of true positives over the total number
of positive outcomes – penalizing classifiers that simply choose the modal outcome in
the context of a rare event. The CVFM is agnostic regarding the method used to
estimate the parameters of the predictive model. The model only needs to provide a
prediction regarding the modal state of the binary outcome. Let TP (t) be the number
of ones in the tth collective decision that are predicted to be ones (i.e. true positives),
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FP (t) be the number of zeros in the tth collective decision that are predicted to be ones
(i.e. false positives), and FN (t) be the number of ones in the tth collective decision that
are predicted to be zeros (i.e. false negatives). The CVFM is then given by
CV FM =
2
∑T
t=1 TP
(t)
2
∑T
t=1 TP
(t) +
∑T
t=1 FP
(t) + 2
∑T
t=1 FN
(t)
. (2.6)
The higher the CVFM, the better the fit of the model.9 The CVFM provides a com-
prehensive summary of the predictive performance of a model, is semi-parametric in
that it only relies on a distribution insofar as one is used to provide the predictions,
and can be used to compare multiple explanations of collective decision-making.
2.4 Jurisprudential Regimes in the U.S. Supreme
Court
In the current section I demonstrate the use of the ERCM by replicating and extending
a model from Richards and Kritzer (2002) of U.S. Supreme Court votes on the merits
in all first amendment (i.e. free press, free expression and free speech) cases from the
1953 – 1998. It is a replication in that (1) I use the exact same data from the original
article, (2) I include all of the covariates that appeared in the original analysis, and (3)
the ERCM can reduce to the original method – logistic regression – if the addition of
endogenous terms in the ERCM do not significantly improve the fit of the model. The
extension I offer is to include a number of new terms in the model that represent well
known configurational theories of decision-making on the Court, but have yet to be
appropriately included in models of justice-votes on the merits – an incredibly popular
9Unfortunately, like AIC and BIC, the sampling distribution of the CVFM is not available and it
is therefore not possible to test hypotheses regarding differences in the CVFM. A bootstrap approach
might be possible, but inquiry into this possibility is beyond the scope of the current analysis.
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method for testing theory about decision-making on the Supreme Court (see e.g. Segal
and Spaeth (1993, 2002) and Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs (2006) for some widely
cited recent examples). A conceptualization of the unit analysis that applies to both
the original logistic regression model and the ERCM is the collection of justice-votes
on a case. There are 570 cases in the data, and therefore 570 collective decisions under
study. As is proven in the final section of this chapter, the logistic regression model
where the unit of analysis is the individual justice-vote can be considered an ERCM in
which the parameters on terms capturing case-level interdependence among the justices’
decisions are assumed to be zero.
2.4.1 Richards and Kritzer (2002)
Richards and Kritzer (2002) offer a novel conceptualization of the influence of law or
precedent on the decision-making of the U.S. Supreme Court. Instead of influencing
decision-making directly (e.g. decision X dictates the Court should rule in a certain
direction in today’s case) – the conception typically used by Court scholars (Knight
and Epstein, 1996; Segal and Spaeth, 1996; Spriggs and Hansford, 2002) – they argue
that important cases influence the factors considered by the Court in subsequent cases
– a framing that can skew the ideological balance of future decisions. Richards and
Kritzer (2002) term the collection of factors considered in cases in a particular area
a jurisprudential regime. A jurisprudential regime dictates what facts of the case are
relevant to the decision, and does not establish what decision the Court should make.
To test their theory of the operation of jurisprudential regimes, Richards and Kritzer
(2002) identify the 1972 cases Chicago Police Department v. Mosley and Grayned v.
Rockford as establishing a new jurisprudential regime in first amendment cases. These
cases establish that content-based limitations on speech (e.g. passengers cannot to
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speak of “bombing” in airports) should be subjected to greater scrutiny than content-
neutral limitations (e.g. citizens cannot speak at a volume that disturbs the peace).
They argue that this regime encourages a liberal shift in first amendment decisions –
increasing the likelihood that limitations of speech will be overturned by the Court.
Richards and Kritzer (2002) use logistic regression to study whether a Supreme
Court justice is more likely to vote to overturn limitations of speech post-Grayned
than they were prior to the claimed establishment of the content-neutrality regime.
They consider all 4,986 justice-votes in first amendment cases decided in the 1953
– 1998 terms. The dependent variable is binary and coded as (1 = anti-expression
rights (conservative), 0 = pro-expression rights (liberal)). They use a dummy variable
to indicate whether the justice-vote being considered was cast after the decision in
Grayned was announced. Their expectation is that the post-Grayned indicator variable
will have a negative effect on the likelihood a justice will vote against expression rights.
Richards and Kritzer (2002) include a number of controls in their model to protect
against faulty inference through omitted variable bias. The controls include a measure
of the liberal-conservative ideology of the justices Justice Ideology – the Segal-Cover
score of the justice – as well as sets of indicator variables that capture characteristics
of the Jurisprudence in the case, the action taken to limit expression, characteristics of
the governing body limiting expression and indicators for categorizations of the identity
of the expression-limited party in the case. 10
I was unable to replicate the original model exactly. Specifically, there is some
inconsistency in the results for the categorical variables. In table 3, I report the original
results along with (1) my best attempt at replicating the logistic regression results from
the original article, and (2) the results from the extended ERCM.
10See the original article for an in-depth justification for the inclusion of these variables as well as
specific hypotheses.
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2.4.2 Configurational Theories of Supreme Court Decision-
Making
As noted above, it is common in many areas of political inquiry to transform or ag-
gregate data in order to optimize its use in testing a particular theory, and scholarship
on U.S. Supreme Court decision-making is no exception. The dilemma posed by this
practice is that, though these theories may be directly testable on some transformation
of justice-vote data, a positive finding in favor of a configurational theory supports
the contention that conventional micro-level regression models are misspecified. If
the configurational theory operates as a component of the data generating process for
justice-votes and, as a result, can be seen in a transformation of justice-vote data, the
assumption of correct specification that is common to virtually all data analysis meth-
ods used by scholars of the Court is violated – leading to misspecification bias. In this
section I present the configurational theories of Supreme Court voting on the merits
that I extend the model in Richards and Kritzer (2002) to accommodate. Note that
these are not covariates that are added to the model. These are characteristics of the
case-level outcome that effect the probability of observing particular combinations of
votes on cases. They are statistics defined on case-level outcomes that are intended
to capture common configurational theories of decision-making on the Court. Though
the estimates of their corresponding parameters can be listed in a table in the same
way that covariate effects can, there is no way to include them in the columns of a
conventional rectangular dataset.
Perhaps the most significant task undertaken by the chief justice (CJ) on the U.S.
Supreme Court is the assignment of authorship for the majority opinion (Maltzman,
Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 2000). If the majority in the final vote on the merits includes
the CJ, the CJ assigns authorship of the written opinion. This creates an incentive,
independent of the CJ’s personal preference regarding the two sides of a case, for the CJ
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to vote with the majority. Even if the decision of the Court is opposite the preference
of the CJ, he or she may be able to steer the legal influence of the decision by assigning
authorship to a more moderate justice. Johnson, Spriggs and Wahlbeck (2005) find
that the CJ passes on the conference vote in order to observe the votes of the other
justices and eventually vote with the majority. When it comes to the final vote on the
merits, if the CJ votes with the majority to assign opinion authorship, the final majority
coalition in the vote should include the CJ more often than would be expected based
on his or her ideological preferences or the facts of the case. This is a configurational
proposition that cannot be tested or accommodated in a logit model of the liberal-
conservative direction of justice-votes, but can be in an ERCM. I add to the model of
Richards and Kritzer (2002) an indicator that assumes a value of one if the CJ is in
the majority coalition and zero otherwise (CJ in Majority). It is expected that this
measure will have a positive effect on the probability of a case outcome.
Much scholarship on the Court has noted a “freshman effect” for justices in their
first term or two after appointment (Dorff and Brenner, 1992; Hagle, 1993; Hurwitz and
Stefko, 2004). In this period justices are said to be more moderate in their ideological
behavior. More specifically, they demonstrate a greater tendency towards conformity –
voting with the majority – than the other justices on the Court at the time (Dorff and
Brenner, 1992) or themselves later in their careers (Hurwitz and Stefko, 2004). Dorff
and Brenner (1992) demonstrates this by showing that freshman justices are more likely
to change their vote from the original conference to the final vote on the merits if they
are in the minority in the initial conference vote. Hurwitz and Stefko (2004) show that
the ideological extremity of justices is much greater later in their career than earlier. If
it is true that freshman justices are more likely to vote with the majority than would
be expected based on ideological or case factors, then this should be accounted for in
the model of justice-votes on the merits. I add to the model an indicator that assumes
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a value of one if a freshman justice, defined as a justice serving in his or her first term,
is in the majority coalition and zero otherwise (Freshman Effect). It is expected that
this measure will have a positive effect on the probability of a case outcome.
The final configurational theory I add to the model regards the size of the voting
majority in a case. All decisions are not treated equally by lower courts and other
subsequent users of Supreme Court doctrine. Johnson (1979) demonstrates that lower
courts (U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals) are more likely to follow Supreme Court deci-
sions that involve a larger voting majority. This creates a clear incentive for justices
to work towards consensus in conference (Dorff and Brenner, 1992) – at times going
as far as to offer opinion authorship to the opposite side in order to increase the size
of the majority coalition (Maltzman, Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 2000). Dorff and Brenner
(1992) find that it is particularly difficult for one or two member minorities to hold their
ground – leading to a tendency toward either consensus or contentious decisions (i.e.
9-0 or {6−3, 5−4} respectively). To accommodate this possibility I add to the model a
quadratic in the proportion of justices in the majority % in Majority and [% in Major-
ity]2. First, if there is truly a tendency toward consensus, then this polynomial should
be at its highest value when % in Majority is one. Second, if group-level dynamics play
out such that small minorities are more easily convinced into the majority, then this
polynomial should assume a U-shape – indicating that both consensus and contentious
votes are more likely than small minorities. The estimates of the coalitional effects
constitute, to my knowledge, the first estimation of general distributional tendencies of
the Court that controls for the effects of ideological disagreements and other important
case-level factors.
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Table 2.1: Alternative Models of U.S. Supreme Court Voting
Original Logit Replication ERCM
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coeficient Std. Error
Intercept/Sum 0.420∗ 0.160 0.893∗ 0.153 0.794∗ 0.171
Post-Grayned -0.350∗ 0.090 -0.345∗ 0.088 -0.873∗ 0.101
Justice Ideology -1.070∗ 0.060 -1.072∗ 0.056 -1.421∗ 0.065
Jurisprudence
(Baseline = Less Protected)
Content-Based -0.740∗ 0.090 -0.735∗ 0.086 -0.303∗ 0.096
Content-Neutral 0.440∗ 0.140 0.442∗ 0.139 0.037 0.152
Below Threshold 1.300∗ 0.230 1.265∗ 0.223 0.705 0.239
Identity
(Baseline = Other)
Politician 0.100 0.300 -0.600∗ 0.150 -0.178 0.165
Racial Minority -0.600∗ 0.150 -0.120 0.125 0.035 0.139
Alleged Communist -0.120 0.130 0.534∗ 0.210 0.048 0.243
Military Protester 0.540∗ 0.210 -0.331∗ 0.101 -0.203 0.112
Business -0.330∗ 0.100 -0.690∗ 0.189 -0.278 0.208
Religious -0.690∗ 0.190 -0.365∗ 0.123 -0.109 0.142
Media -0.030∗ 0.140 -0.028 0.139 0.025 0.155
Government
(Baseline = State)
Other 0.170 0.480 -0.164 0.158 0.038 0.179
Private 0.310∗ 0.160 -0.577∗ 0.188 -0.386 0.211
Education -0.110 0.190 -0.485∗ 0.092 -0.098 0.103
Local -0.010 0.100 -0.471∗ 0.084 -0.190∗ 0.094
Federal 0.470∗ 0.080 -0.380∗ 0.114 -0.151 0.128
Action
(Baseline = Civil)
Criminal -0.380∗ 0.110 -0.392∗ 0.122 -0.218 0.137
Deny Expression -0.390∗ 0.120 0.610∗ 0.146 0.243 0.161
Deny Benefit 0.610∗ 0.150 -0.818∗ 0.234 -0.223 0.259
Disciplinary -0.820∗ 0.240 0.336∗ 0.167 0.195 0.185
Regulation 0.050∗ 0.190 0.049 0.187 0.050 0.208
Configurational Statistics
% Majority – – – – -3.934∗ 0.688
[% Majority]2 – – – – 9.116∗ 0.582
CJ in Majority – – – – 0.276∗ 0.075
Freshman Effect – – – – 0.271∗ 0.110
AIC – 5,957 5,055
BIC – 6,107 5,231
CVFM – 0.459 0.488
Note: Coefficients with standard errors reported. All models estimated on 4,986 justice-
votes in 570 cases. * – Statistically significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). Dependent
variable is coded (0 = Liberal (pro-expression), 1 = Conservative (anti-expression)).
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2.4.3 Results
The results from the original logistic regression and extended ERCM are presented in
table 3.11 First, in terms of overall fit, it is apparent that the ERCM out-performs
logistic regression. The parametric AIC and BIC are lower in the ERCM and the cross-
validated F-measure (CVFM) is higher in the ERCM – all pointing to the ERCM as
the better-fitting model. Additionally, with a likelihood ratio statistic of 910 and four
degrees of freedom, the validity of the restriction to the original logit model is rejected
any any conventional level of statistical significance. This is strong evidence that co-
variates do not sufficiently explain commonly observed forms of interdependence on the
Court. The configurational terms cannot be ignored without inducing misspecification
bias. Case-level interdependence among the decisions made by the justices is as critical
to the explanation of decision-making on the U.S. Supreme Court as are the effects of
exogenous covariates.
In terms of the effects that appear in both models, the results in the ERCM differ
considerably from those in the original logistic regression. First, the main independent
variable of interest Post-Grayned has an effect nearly twice the magnitude of that in
the original model – a difference that is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In the
logit model, the effect of the addition of a conservative vote to a case on the likelihood
of observing that case post-Grayned is 30% lower that the effect pre-Grayned.12 This
percentage decrease is estimated to be 58% in the ERCM. Thus, the original jurispru-
dential regimes hypothesis garners stronger support in the ERCM than in the logit.
However, fourteen of the sixteen categorical effects that differed significantly from their
11This model, since the maximum number of actors in a Supreme Court case is 9, was estimated by
maximum likelihood. The function optim() in the R statistical software (R Development Core Team,
2009) was used to maximize the likelihood and estimate the Hessian. The standard errors come from
the asymptotic covariance matrix derived by inverting the negative Hessian.
12This is computed as 100× (exp{−0.345} − 1) = −30.
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respective baselines in the logit model were not different from the baselines in the
ERCM – indicating that many of the inferences on the effects of these variables were
incorrect and attributable to misspecification bias. Indeed, if the categorical variables
Identity, Government and Action are dropped from the ERCM, a likelihood ratio test
indicates with a p-value of 0.257 that the restriction is valid.
Overall the configurational effects work as expected. All else equal, we are more
likely to observe cases in which the chief justice votes with the majority than cases
in which the chief votes with the minority. Specifically, the probability of observing a
particular configuration in a case is increased by 32% if that configuration includes the
chief justice in the majority coalition. This supports the contention that the CJ often
joins the majority in spite of his or her ideological predisposition. Similarly, all else
equal, when a freshman justice is on the Court, we are more likely to observe cases in
which the freshman justice votes with the majority than cases in which the he or she
votes with the minority. The probability of observing a configuration is 30% higher if
the configuration includes a freshman justice in the majority. This is consistent with
past notions of the “freshman effect”. These findings represent two well-understood
and important components of the data generating process for justice-votes on the U.S.
Supreme Court, but cannot be accommodated in the logistic regression framework.
The ERCM, for the first time, allows scholars of the Court to account for these factors
in a model of justice-votes.
The finding regarding the likely majority coalition size is one of a tendency toward
unanimity. All else equal, the larger the majority coalition in a particular collective
outcome, the more likely we are to observe that particular outcome. The distributional
tendencies of the majority coalition size are depicted in figure 2.4.3.13 The x-axis of this
13Using the method presented in King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000), 10,000 draws from the asymp-
totic sampling distribution were used to construct the confidence intervals in this plot.
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Figure 2.2: Distributional Tendencies of Supreme Court Decisions
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Note: The points give the expected logarithm of the ratio of the probability of observing
the case outcome on the y-axis to observing a 5-4 decision. The black bars span 95%
simulated confidence intervals.
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figure gives the natural logarithm of the ratio of the probability of observing the case
outcome on the y-axis to observing a 5-4 decision. Values greater than zero indicate
that that particular majority-minority combination is more likely to occur than is a 5-4
decision. A value below zero would correspond to a ratio less than one and indicate
that a 5-4 decision is more likely than the decision given on the y-axis. None of the
95% confidence intervals in the figure contain a value below zero, indicating that a
5-4 outcome is the least likely outcome. Moreover, the ratio is increasing in the size
of the majority coalition, indicating that the likelihood of observing a case outcome is
strictly increasing in the size of the majority coalition. The likelihood of observing a 9-0
decision is exp{4.7} = 109.9 times the likelihood of observing a 5-4 decision if there is
no ideological disagreement or other divisive case factor involved. There is no evidence
here for a U-shaped distributional tendency. The modus operandi on the Court is the
unanimous decision. This tendency towards consensus is interrupted by ideological or
legal disagreements to produce non-unanimous decisions.
2.5 Conclusion
In virtually every area of collective choice studied by political scientists there are theo-
ries that imply forms of interdependence between the individual decisions that form the
collective outcome. This interdependence is as important to the data generating process
as the dependence of decisions on exogenous covariates. Yet the literature on collective
decision-making has either (1) ignored interdependence in the interest of estimating
the effect of exogenous covariates on micro-level choices or (2) transformed individual
decision data in order to study the interdependence extant in collective choice. I pro-
pose the exponential random configuration model can be used to study determinants
of individual decisions as well as any form of dependence between them simultaneously.
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In order to accommodate a theory of dependence, researchers need to identify configu-
rations within the collective decision that theory predicts should be more or less likely
to occur. The theory is then operationalized as arithmetic functions that measure these
configurations. This process of configurational model-building provides an accessible,
iterative approach to the construction and testing of interdependent theories of collec-
tive choice. An added benefit of using the ERCM to study interdependent choice is
that the model reduces to logistic regression on the individual decisions if exogenous
covariates constitute the only systematic determinants of the collective outcomes.
To demonstrate the utility of the ERCM in the study of repeated collective choice
I replicate and extend a model of the ideological direction of justice-votes on the U.S.
Supreme Court, first appearing in Richards and Kritzer (2002). I show how three im-
portant configurational theories of decision-making on the Court – the majoritarianism
of the chief justice, conformity voting on the part of freshman justices, and the tendency
towards consensus – can be accommodated along with covariates to explain justices’
votes on the merits in Supreme Court cases. In doing so I show that the effect of
jurisprudential regimes on justices’ choices was notably underestimated in the original
model, and I found evidence that many of the original findings regarding case factors
that influence justices’ choices are attributable to misspecification bias. There is much
opportunity across the subfields in political science for future work in the spirit of this
replication. For instance, legislature-specific interaction effects in the ERCM applied
to roll-call voting would permit a comparative study of the ways in which institutional
and/or electoral rules structure the interdependence in legislative decision-making. In
sum, the ERCM represents an empirical approach that does not require researchers to
limit theoretical claims to the effects of covariates or to manipulate micro-level data to
study coordination and interdependence between political choices.
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2.6 Logit - A Special Case of ERCM
I show that ERCM with no endogenous terms reduces to logistic regression. I demon-
strate that the conditional probability of an individual actor in a particular instance of
collective choice choosing a one, which has a logistic form, is equivalent to the marginal
probability if no endogenous terms are included in the Γ(y). Equivalence of the con-
ditional and marginal probabilities implies independence of the individual choices –
concluding the proof that ERCM reduces to logit if only covariate terms matter among
the Γ(y).
Pr(yti = 1|yt−i,θ) = logit−1 [θ′∆i(Γ(y))] =
1
1 + exp{− [θ′∆i(Γ(y))]} . (2.7)
If Γj(y) is in the form of the statistic given in equation 2.1, then ∆i(Γj(y)) – the change
in Γj(y) when yi changes from zero to 1, is x
t
ij, so equation 2.7 can be rewritten as
Pr(yti = 1|yt−i,θ) =
1
1 + exp{−θ′xti}
, (2.8)
where xti is equal to the vector of covariates for the i
th observation in the tth collective
decision. Note this is exactly equal to the probability of a one in a logistic regression
where the θ represent the regression coefficients. Also, since the conditional probability
that yi = 1 does not depend on any other value in y, the conditional probability is
equal to the marginal probability that yi = 1, which demonstrates that the individual
components of y are independent conditional on the covariates. Since the values in y
are independent conditional on the covariates, the log-likelihood is constructed as
l(y1,y2, . . . ,yT |θ) = log
(
t∏
t=1
nt∏
i=1
[
1
1 + exp{−θ′xi}
]yti [
1− 1
1 + exp{−θ′xti}
]1−yti)
,
(2.9)
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Which is exactly equivalent to the logistic regression likelihood function with the pooled
individual decisions as the dependent variable and θ representing the regression coeffi-
cients.
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Chapter 3
The U.S. Supreme Court as a
Self-Correcting Institution
“And if every action has a reaction, today’s Supreme Court, with two new Bush ap-
pointees and a distinctly conservative cast, is something of a reaction to the Warren
Court. The modern conservative legal movement was born on campus as a reaction to
the Warren era. Several of the court’s current members were bred in the cauldron of
that movement.”
- Nina Totenberg (June 30, 2008)
3.1 Introduction
What influence do past decisions rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court exert on its
current behavior? Political scientists have provided answers to this question that fall
into two general classes. First, many scholars advocate purely ideological explanations
of the Court’s behavior, contend that existing law places little or no constraint on
the current decisions of the Court (Segal and Spaeth, 1996, 2002). Others have found
evidence for a controlling influence of stare decisis – the tendency of the Court to
follow precedent in its current decisions (Brenner and Stier, 1996; Knight and Epstein,
1996; Richards and Kritzer, 2002). I consider a third possibility – that the current
Court must over-compensate in its ideological decision-making in the direction and
magnitude opposed to the balance of past doctrine in order to desirably locate the
relevant line of legal reasoning.
The opening quote exemplifies a common explanation among legal scholars for the
recent conservatism of the Court. Many ideologically conservative decisions issued by
the U.S. Supreme Court over the last three decades are understood as negative reactions
to the liberal doctrine of the Warren Court (Fallon, 2002; Feld, 2002; Keck, 2002; Lain,
2004; Kennedy, 2006; Cross, Smith and Tomarchio, 2008; Devins, 2008). Contrary to
past conceptions which posit a zero or positive relationship between past decisions and
the current behavior of the Court, I theorize that the ideological content of the Court’s
past work exerts a negative influence on the liberalism of the contemporary Court.1
Current decisions compete with those of the past to inform the regular activities of
legal entities such as administrative agencies, private corporations and lower courts.
This creates an incentive for the Court to counter the ideological bias of past decisions
in order to move the relevant line of legal reasoning to its ideal point. The oft-cited
conservative reaction to the Warren Court is simply an extreme example of the regular
tendency of self-correction exhibited by the modern Supreme Court.
The tendency of the Court to move in opposition to the decisions of the past is
demonstrated through empirical analyses of the term-level liberalism of the Court from
the 1953-2008 terms. This insight has broad implications for the study of the Court. An
implicit or explicit assumption underlying existing theories of decision-making on the
1At first glance, this may appear to be a restatement of the finding of Segal and Spaeth (1990)
that the Court at times practices a reversal strategy. The current theory diverges from this work in
two ways. First, the findings of Segal and Spaeth (1990) apply to the Court’s relationship with lower
courts, and not with past Supreme Court. Second, the explanation for the tendency toward reversal
of the lower court is completely different from my explanation for the Court’s negative relationship
with its past decisions.
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Court is that cases are safely considered in isolation. This assumption is questionable.
Future theoretical accounts of decision-making on the Court should focus on the ways
in which the Court might use cases to achieve the end of an optimal body of legal
policy.
3.2 Self-Correction on the U.S. Supreme Court
There are two previous findings on the creation and use of legal policy by the Supreme
Court that underlie my argument that the Supreme Court is a self-correcting insti-
tution. First, the Supreme Court renders decisions with the objective of moving the
implementation of legal policy toward its ideologically preferred position. Given that
the Court strives to achieve optimal use of its work, I turn to the nature of said usage
by other legal entities. A well-established finding in the literature on compliance with
the Court is that subsequent users of law set by the Supreme Court are influenced by
an accumulation, or body, of law, rather than critical individual cases.2 At the end of
this section I demonstrate that (1) if the Court is concerned with influencing a legal
entity and (2) that entity follows something closer to the average of recent decisions
than the most recent decision in isolation, then the Court has a clear incentive to cancel
out the ideological bias in past decisions.
3.2.1 The Objective of Influence
Countless studies have documented a strong positive association between objective
measures of the liberal-conservative ideology of Court membership and the direction of
decision-making (Segal and Cover, 1989; Hagle and Spaeth, 1991; Flemming and Wood,
2I am not arguing that landmark cases, which reconstitute legal rules, do not occur; they are simply
the exception and not the norm.
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1997; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002; Grofman and Brazill, 2002; Martin and
Quinn, 2002; Lens, 2003; McGuire and Stimson, 2004; Epstein et al., 2007). Though
some scholars hold that justices simply want to vote their preferences without regard to
compliance with Court decisions (see e.g. Schubert (1962, 1965) and Segal and Spaeth
(1993)), the results of many studies align with the observation of Wahlbeck (1998) that,
“Court decisions derive significance from the impact of their rules on expected patterns
of behavior and their sanctions for violations of those patterns.”(pp. 614).
A growing body of work has demonstrated the Court’s concern with Congressional
compliance with its rulings. Eskridge (1991) provides empirical evidence that the Court
modifies its behavior to optimize its influence on subsequent actions of Congress. Spiller
and Gely (1992) find evidence of an ideological Congressional constraint on Supreme
Court decision-making in labor policy cases. Hansford and Damore (2000) find that
when Congress has overridden a statutory decision by the Court, the Court is sensitive
to the ideological preferences of Congress in subsequent treatments of the relevant legal
questions. And Bergara, Richman and Spiller (2003) show that the probability of a
liberal decision increases with the liberalism of members of Congress. These studies
illustrate the Courts’ attentiveness to the likelihood of favorable implementation of its
decisions.
Enjoying stronger empirical support than the Court’s responsiveness to Congress is
the influence of public opinion on the Court. Attentiveness to public opinion demon-
strates the Court’s concern with favorable treatment of its rulings. The logic is as
follows: the Court’s political influence is directly proportional to the degree to which
its decisions are heeded by the elected branches. If its decisions are at odds with the
preferences of the public, and hence lack public support, elected officials will have an in-
centive to disregard the decisions of the Court. Supreme Court Justices do not want to
be ignored, so they take public opinion into account when issuing decisions (McGuire
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and Stimson, 2004). A number of studies have reported that public liberalism in-
fluences the liberalism of the Court. For example, Mishler and Sheehan (1993) find
evidence that the Supreme Court responded positively to public opinion between 1956
and 1981, at which point a negative relationship between public opinion and Supreme
Court ideology emerged. Flemming and Wood (1997) find that public opinion is a pos-
itive determinant of the ideological behavior of individual justices. Erikson, MacKuen
and Stimson (2002); McGuire and Stimson (2004) show that public mood - an annual
measure of the aggregate liberalism of the U.S. public - is a positive determinant of
aggregate annual Supreme Court liberalism. If the Court were not concerned with the
favorable implementation of its rulings, it would have no incentive to bend with public
opinion.
It has been firmly established that the U.S. Supreme Court acts to influence relevant
legal entities. The Court prefers that subsequent users of its rulings behave in a manner
consistent with an ideologically ideal legal policy. Before I can render a theoretical
account of the Court’s management of legal development over time, it will be helpful
to consider the manner in which common legal entities respond to the Court.
3.2.2 Response to Supreme Court Decisions
When the Court strikes down a law, at least when it does so in a high-profile case, it
does much more than merely invalidate a particular statute. It sends a pulse into the
lawmaking process that can have pervasive effects on a wide range of legislation, and
it creates a rhetorical tool that can be used to great effect by ideologically motivated
politicians and legislators.
- Larry Kramer (2000, p. 290)
Countless familiar legal entities make active use of the decisions rendered by the
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U.S. Supreme Court. These include lower courts (Johnson, 1987; Songer, 1987; Songer
and Sheehan, 1990; Songer, Segal and Cameron, 1994; Benesh and Reddick, 2002;
Haire, Songer and Lindquist, 2003; Hoekstra, 2005), administrative agencies (Spriggs,
1996, 1997), the U.S. Congress (Hausegger and Baum, 1999), and private corporations
(Caldeira and Wright, 1990). Subsequent use of a particular case tends to be by and
with rulings that concern a variety of legal issues that do not necessarily address the
primary legal rule of concern in the case. It is relatively uncommon that any legal entity
takes direction from a single Supreme Court decision in isolation. Thus, when deciding
any given case, the Court may be speaking to any number of legal policy areas. By-and-
large, through individual decisions, the Court contributes to a large body of relevant
legal policy, rather than inform precedent on a single narrow area. Moreover, at the
time a case is decided, it is not possible to perfectly predict the range of legal policies
that will be informed by that decision. This impossibility is critical to the strategy the
Supreme Court must take in ascertaining adherence to its ideal legal policy. The Court
will achieve optimal influence by assuring that the aggregate body of law points in its
preferred direction.
Political Scientists have demonstrated that it is incomplete to characterize the lower
courts as responding to single decisions of the Court. Instead, lower courts tend to
follow significant trends in the law. Songer (1987) shows that a statistically significant
change in the aggregate liberalism of the Supreme Court’s antitrust policy is a direct
cause of a corresponding change in the antitrust liberalism of the appellate courts,
but that the relationship between the legal policy set by the Supreme Court and the
appellate courts is missed if the focus is on the impact of individual decisions. Canon
(1973) describes the impact of the Supreme Court on the legal policy of the lower
courts as being through the consistent build-up of a large body of precedents. In
another explication of the gravitational force of prior decisions rendered by the Court,
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H. (1974) observes that, “The majority of lower court disavowals [of established lines
of precedent] have followed an implicit but substantial modification of a precedent by
the Supreme Court.”(pp. 516). In other words, the Court must deviate considerably
from an established legal rule in order to move lower courts away from the use of that
precedent. The implication of this work is that the Supreme Court must build a robust
body of supporting law if the objective is to motivate lower courts to follow suit.
Government administrators also recognize and respond to the accumulation of rel-
evant Court decisions rather than individual cases independently. Wahlbeck (1998)
explains that individual cases do not make or break legal rules regarding environmen-
tal regulation – rather legal rules adapt incrementally through the contributions of new
cases. Cooper (1986) explains how government information policy is formed by the
body of Freedom of Information Act cases, First Amendment rulings, and the interre-
latedness between those two bodies of law. Jaegal and Cayer (1991) review the marked
effects that five Supreme Court cases in the latter half of the 20th century have had
on the practice of federal public personnel administration. Lens (2001) explains how,
through a series of decisions, the Court is entering a “New Era” in its treatment of civil
rights and social welfare laws, thus limiting the scope of progressive legislation. These
are all clear examples of the influence of the accumulation of legal policy.
Two of the most prevalent targets of Supreme Court rulings – lower courts and
administrative agencies – respond not to individual cases but to the summary rule em-
bedded in a line of relevant decisions. A Court that wishes to affect the behavior of legal
entities such as these must do so by constructing an aggregate of legal policy located
at its ideological ideal. In order to derive a precise empirical prediction regarding the
behavior of a self-correcting Court, in the next section I use a simple formal account of
the process by which the Court would target an optimal body of law through time.
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3.3 The Process of Self-Correction
In this section I posit a simple formal model that captures the process of self-correction
undertaken by a Supreme Court concerned with influencing subsequent actors that
respond to the average legal rule in a relevant body of law. The Court sets the liberalism
of the current term at a point on a unidimensional conservative-liberal continuum, and
the subsequent legal entity implements a policy along the same dimension - taking into
consideration the liberalism of existing law, including that of the current term. The
Court prefers that the subsequent legal entity set policy as close as possible to the
Court’s ideal point. I will arrive at the expected behavior of the Court through the
method of backwards induction. First I describe the policy choice (P ) of the subsequent
legal entity given the average liberalism of previous decisions (L0) and the liberalism of
the current term (Lt). Next I give the utility the Court derives from setting the current
liberalism at Lt given L0, the Court’s ideal policy (C) and the resulting behavior of
the subsequent actor. Once the Court’s utility is specified, I derive its optimal choice
for current liberalism – that which sets P = C (i.e. that which motivates the relevant
legal entity to set policy at the Court’s ideal point).
Following the findings described in section 3.2.2, it is assumed that the subsequent
actor implements a legal policy that represents a combination of past and current
decisions. As an abstraction of this process I specify the implemented legal policy P
as a weighted average of the past and current liberalism of the Supreme Court. Let
α ∈ [0, 1] be the weight applied to past liberalism, then the expected legal policy is
P = αL0︸︷︷︸
Past Terms
+ (1− α)Lt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Current Term
. (3.1)
The utility of the Court is given by the negative of the absolute difference between
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its ideal point and the policy implemented by the legal entity
UC = −|C − P |.
Substituting the right-hand-side of equation 3.1 into the Court’s utility function gives
UC = −|C − [αL0 + (1− α)Lt]|.
The Court chooses the current liberalism that maximizes its utility. Since the Court’s
utility is the negative of an absolute value, it is maximized when the term in the absolute
value is equal to zero such that
C − [αL0 + (1− α)Lt] = 0.
Solving for Lt shows that the optimal level of liberalism in the current time point is
L∗t =
1
1− α
 C︸︷︷︸
Court Ideology
− αL0︸︷︷︸
Self-Correction
 . (3.2)
The under-bracketed terms in equation 3.2 represent the two essential processes
undertaken by a Court that targets an optimal body of law through time. The first
term (Court Ideology) represents the adjustment of current liberalism for current fac-
tors determining the Court’s preferred policy. This is the Court’s ideal equilibrium
(i.e. time-invariant) level of liberalism for the body of law. The second term (Self-
Correction) is the correction for any ideological bias from the past. The expected
change in current liberalism due to a one unit increase in past liberalism is given by
the first partial derivative of L∗t with respect to L0 and is equal to
dL∗t
dL0
=
−α
1− α. (3.3)
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At first glance, it is counter-intuitive that the expected change in current liberalism due
to an increase in past liberalism does not depend on the Court’s ideology. Conceptual-
izing adjustment of the body of law as a two-step process motivates the intuition behind
this result. The first adjustment step is to negate any past bias in the liberalism of the
law – effectively zeroing it out. The next step is to move the liberalism of the law from
zero to the Court’s preferred position of C. This is not actually a sequential process
– it occurs with a single decision, but the two-step metaphor helps to decompose the
current behavior of the Court into (1) its reaction to the past and (2) its pursuit of
current objectives.
The sign of the reaction to an increase in past liberalism – given in equation 3.3 –
is always negative, because α ∈ [0, 1] and as a result α
1−α is strictly positive. Current
Courts will always react in the opposite direction of ideological biases of the past. The
conservatism of recent Supreme Courts can be understood through the conservative
values of the justices sitting on the Court (i.e. C) and a negative reaction to the
extreme liberalism of the Warren Court. The supposed reaction to Warren is sufficient
as a motivating example, but does not constitute robust empirical evidence of a self-
correcting Court. In the next section I show that the Court has behaved as if it were
targeting an optimal body of law from the 1953 to 2008 terms.
3.4 The Empirical Test
3.4.1 Dependent Variables
The objective in this empirical analysis is to test whether the liberalism of past decisions
rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court has a negative effect on the current liberalism of
the Court, which is the expected relationship under a Court that targets an optimal
body of law rather than independent cases. I analyze the term-level liberalism of the
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Supreme Court from the 1953-2008 terms. The dependent variable in each analysis is
the within-term proportion of cases decided in favor of the the more liberal side. The
ideological coding of decisions comes from The Supreme Court Database (Spaeth et al.,
2010).
There are two common approaches to the analysis of Supreme Court decisions –
consideration of term-aggregated liberalism as a time-series (Baum, 1988, 1992; Mish-
ler and Sheehan, 1993; Grofman and Brazill, 2002; McGuire and Stimson, 2004) and
pooling decisions over terms, treating them as independent conditional on the covari-
ates (Richards and Kritzer, 2002; Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs, 2006; Wohlfarth,
2009). There are two main reasons why I analyze term-level liberalism. First and more
importantly, the test for self-correction requires knowledge of the sequence of decisions.
The hypothesis is that the liberalism of past cases has a negative impact on that of
current decisions. Within a term, two critical dates are the oral argument date and the
date the decision was announced. There is often a non-trivial interval of time between
argument and decision, and it is common that cases will be argued and decided between
the argument and decision dates of other cases (Hoekstra and Johnson, 2003). These
unequal intervals eschew the sequence of events. Averaging over a term eliminates un-
certainty about the sequence of events. All cases from one term are both argued and
decided before those of the next term. The second justification lies in the difficulty of
identifying the relevant legal policy neighborhood of an individual case. The theory
states that current liberalism will be negatively related to the liberalism of the existing
body of law. It is reasonable to posit that the average case within a term - in which
numerous topics are considered - will respond to the average cases from previous terms,
but it is less reasonable to consider each individual case responsive to all other cases.
Averaging over terms washes out legal-policy idiosyncrasies - an example of aggregation
gain (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1989).
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I analyze four different variants of term-level liberalism. The choice of dependent
variables is intended to balance aggregation gain and the intra-series relevance of cases.
First, I examine the time series including all cases, which offers the greatest gain from
aggregation – washing out noise from idiosyncratic legal and political factors that are
not included in the model. This constitutes the most general test of self-correcting
dynamics on the Court. The one drawback of considering all cases is that the series is
derived from combining possibly unrelated cases from different legal areas. Following
McGuire and Stimson (2004), I also consider separately term-level liberalism in the legal
issue areas Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights and Liberties, and Economic Activity –
delineating according to the Issue Area coding in the Supreme Court Database. There
are obviously fewer cases within each issue area than all the cases in a term, but cases
in these series are more likely to be topically related – and we would thus be more
likely to observe active targeting of an optimal body of relevant law. Next I describe
the measurement of the key independent variable - the liberalism of the body of law -
and the other control variables.3
3.4.2 The Liberalism of the Body of Law
In order to test whether the U.S. Supreme Court self-corrects and thus reacts in opposi-
tion to the ideological balance of the existing law, I must measure the liberalism of the
law. I use two alternative measures. Since, in deriving the dependent variable for the
analysis, I have already measured the term-level liberalism of the Court’s output, I use
term liberalism as the basic building block of the first measure of the overall liberalism
of the law. The liberal balance of the law (Cumulative Liberalism) is measured as the
3McGuire and Stimson (2004) suggest using only reversals of lower court decisions to compute
aggregate measures of Court liberalism. They argue that reversals provide a more sincere ideological
signal. In the spirit of robustness, I estimated all of the models with reversals only. The key result
of this study – the negative relationship between the liberal balance of the body of law and current
liberalism – holds up if only reversals are included.
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sum of the proportion of liberal decisions in past terms less 0.5, which is given as
CLt =
t−1∑
i=1952
pi
(L)
i − 0.5,
where pi
(L)
i is the proportion of liberal decisions in the i
th term. The constant 0.5 is
subtracted for each term so that a term that is more conservative than liberal decreases
Cumulative Liberalism and vice versa. This variable is expected to have a negative effect
on term-level liberalism.
One possible critique of the Cumulative Liberalism measure as an operationalization
for the current liberalism in the law is that it treats the contribution of the last term
and a term from thirty years back as contributing equally to the ideological balance of
existing law. Fowler and Jeon (2008), through an analysis of citation patterns between
U.S. Supreme Court cases, find that the importance of a case, which increases with
the number of cases that cite it and, recursively, the importance of cases that cite it,
is not constant over time.4 Cases generally see an initial upward trend, then decline in
importance through time. Fowler and Jeon (2008) derive a measure of the authority
of every case ever decided by the Court, which varies from term to term. The measure
of authority for case a is proportional to both the number of cases that cite it and the
hub score of those cases, where the hub of case b is a measure of how many important
cases are cited by b. The authority scores are estimated by solving a set of equations
defined on the entire citation network that express the authority of case a as a sum
of the hub scores of the cases that cite it.5 Because the authority of every case is
4This measure of importance is based on a recursive algorithm for finding influential works in
citation networks developed by Kleinberg (1999). Fowler and Jeon (2008) validate their measure by
showing that the list of important cases generated by their method corresponds closely with expert
rankings appearing in The Oxford Guide to United States Supreme Court Decisions, Congressional
Quarterly’s Guide to the United States Supreme Court, and a list generated by the Legal Information
Institute.
5See (Fowler and Jeon, 2008, pp. 20) for more details on the authority measure.
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measured repeatedly through time, this measure can be used to adjust the measure of
the liberalism of the law for the importance life-cycle of a decision. The second measure
of the liberalism of the law (Liberal Authority) is the proportion of total authority of
past cases – the sum of authority scores at time t over past liberal and conservative
decisions – that belong to liberal decisions giving
LAt =
∑
∀i∈Lt αit∑
∀i∈Lt αit +
∑
∀i∈Ct αit
,
where αit is the authority of the i
th case at time t, Lt and Ct are the sets of past liberal
and conservative decisions at time t respectively. Liberal Authority is expected to have
a negative effect on term liberalism. A time-series presentation of the measures of term
and body-of-law liberalism variables is rendered in figure 3.4.2.6
3.4.3 Control Variables and Estimation Strategy
Three control variables are considered. First, a lagged dependent variable is included
in most models to account for any autocorrelation in Term Liberalism.7 The second
control variable (Public Opinion) is an annual measure of the liberalism of the American
Public, the measure of public policy mood used by Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson
(2002), which McGuire and Stimson (2004) find has a positive effect on the term-level
liberalism of the Court. I include Public Opinion in all analyses. The last control (Court
Ideology) is a measure of the ideological preference of the Court and is given as the
average Segal-Cover score (Segal and Cover, 1989) of the justices on the Court.Court
Ideology is included in every model.
6Since the authority scores are only available through 2002, models including Liberal Authority
only include the 1953-2002 terms.
7The dynamic specification in these models is notably simple – a lagged dependent variable at
most. Though simple, it seems quite adequate. The Ljung-Box test (Ljung and Box, 1978) does not
reject the null hypothesis that the residuals are white noise for any of the models estimated.
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Ordinary least squares (OLS) is used to estimate the model with all cases included.
If the error term in the models contain factors that determine the general liberalism of
the Court, there may be correlation between the residuals in the models separated by
policy area. More efficient estimates, relative to those produced with OLS, are provided
if I account for this correlation using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) (Conniffe,
1982). The parameters of the Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights and Liberties, and
Economic Activity models are estimated as a three-equation system with SUR.8
3.4.4 Results
The regression results are presented in tables 3.4.4-4. For each dependent variable,
I present five models. The first model (I) serves as a baseline for comparison and
does not include either of the measures of the liberalism of the body of law. The
second (II) and fourth (IV) – representing purely theoretical specifications – omit the
lagged-dependent variable and include Cumulative Liberalism and Liberal Authority
respectively. The third (III) and fifth (V) models – referred to as the full models –
include lagged liberalism and that of the body of law.9
The results for the models including all cases in the dependent variable, presented
in table 3.4.4, strongly support my claim that the Court is a self-correcting institution.
The estimates of the coefficients on Cumulative Liberalism and Liberal Authority are
negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed). A term in which
8The authority scores are available at James Fowler’s website http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu/.
The updated time series of Public Opinion is available at James Stimson’s website
http://www.unc.edu/∼jstimson/. Segal-Cover scores are available at Jeffrey Segal’s website
http://www.stonybrook.edu/polsci/jsegal/. The statistical software R is used for all compu-
tations (R Development Core Team, 2009). The add-on package systemfit is used for the SUR
(Henningsen and Hamann, 2007). An intercept is estimated in each model, but not reported.
9Cumulative Liberalism and Liberal Authority are not included in the same model due to the fact
that they are alternative measures of the same concept – rendering the ceteris-paribus interpretation
of the coefficients non-sensical – and they are highly correlated.
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Table 3.1: Term-Level Liberalism: all Cases Included
I II III IV V
Liberalismt−1 0.174 – 0.065 – 0.159
(0.141) – (0.132) – (0.128)
Cumulative Liberalism – -0.036* -0.0348* – –
– (0.00969) (0.0101) – –
Liberal Authority – – – -0.423* -0.41*
– – – (0.0978) (0.0978)
Public Opinion 0.0041* 0.0035 0.00321 0.00723* 0.00657*
(0.00245) (0.00214) (0.00224) (0.00223) (0.00228)
Court Ideology 0.367* 0.491* 0.461* 0.411* 0.337*
(0.079) (0.0467) (0.0767) (0.0489) (0.0765)
Adjusted-R2 0.733 0.784 0.781 0.819 0.822
N 54 54 54 47 47
Note: Analysis of term level liberalism in all cases. OLS coefficients are reported with
standard errors in parentheses. * = Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed).
60% of the cases are decided in a liberal direction contributes 0.10 to Cumulative
Liberalism, causing an approximate 0.0035 decrease in the following term’s liberalism,
a (0.10-0.0035)0.35 = 0.0338 decrease in the liberalism of the term after the next and
so forth. A liberal term sets the Court on a conservative trajectory, and a conservative
term a liberal trajectory. In terms of the control variables, the effect of Public Opinion
is positive in all of the models and statistically significantly so in three of the models –
indicating that the Court follows the ideology of the public. Lastly, the effect of Court
Ideology is as expected and strongly significant in every equation. It is seen that the
typical control for dynamics, the lagged dependent variable, exerts little effect. It is not
statistically significant in any of the models, and reduces the Adjusted R2 from model
II to III.
When it comes to the individual legal policy areas, the results – presented in tables
2-5 – are largely indicative of a Court that targets an optimal body of law. Every
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coefficient estimate is negative for both Cumulative Liberalism and Liberal Authority
across policy areas. Moreover, the effects are statistically significant in the areas of
criminal procedure and economic activity, but not in civil rights and liberties cases.
The lack of significance in the area of civil rights and liberties may be due to the non-
technical nature of the issues considered in that area. In the formal model presented
in the previous section, the parameter α determined the relative influence of current
decisions on the behavior of subsequent actors. In effect, this parameter determines
the degree to which the Court can overwrite past legal policy with a single decision. If
this parameter is set at its maximum of 1, legal policy can be rewritten with a single
decision, the only important decision in the eyes of legal actors is the Court’s current
policy, and there is no self-correction on the Court. Since issues considered in the area
of civil rights and liberties are not very technical relative to other areas (Tate, 1981)
and thus less likely to lead to ambiguity as to when and where decisions apply, it is
easier to redirect the body of law with a single decision. It is likely that α is much
higher in civil rights and liberties than in economic activity and criminal procedure,
leading to a more moderate effect that requires a longer time series to uncover with
precision. In terms of the control variables, the results herein diverge from those of
McGuire and Stimson (2004). I find that Public Opinion has a statistically significant
positive effect in economic activity but not in civil rights and liberties cases, whereas
McGuire and Stimson (2004) find the opposite.
88
Table 3.2: Term-Level Liberalism in Criminal Procedure Cases
I II III IV V
Liberalismt−1 0.227* – 0.194* – 0.236*
(0.127) – (0.126) – (0.132)
Cumulative Liberalism – -0.0298* -0.0263* – –
– (0.013) (0.0129) – –
Liberal Authority – – – -0.301* -0.309*
– – – (0.171) (0.167)
Public Opinion 0.0101* 0.00768* 0.00684 0.00953* 0.00831*
(0.00398) (0.00424) (0.00419) (0.00437) (0.00427)
Court Ideology 0.289* 0.612* 0.498* 0.459* 0.338*
(0.101) (0.127) (0.144) (0.0956) (0.114)
Adjusted R2 0.558 0.559 0.578 0.56 0.59
N 54 54 54 47 47
Note: Analysis of term-level liberalism in criminal procedure cases. OLS coefficients
are reported with standard errors in parentheses. * = Significant at the 0.05 level
(one-tailed).
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Table 3.3: Term-Level Liberalism in Civil Rights and Liberties Cases
I II III IV V
Liberalismt−1 0.0121 – 0.0221 – 0.0303
(0.133) – (0.134) – (0.147)
Cumulative Liberalism – -0.0152 -0.0152 – –
– (0.0148) (0.0151) – –
Liberal Authority – – – -0.273 -0.288
– – – (0.22) (0.223)
Public Opinion 0.00581 0.00591 0.00576 0.00414 0.00383
(0.004) (0.00386) (0.00401) (0.00464) (0.00475)
Court Ideology 0.54* 0.486* 0.475* 0.59* 0.576*
(0.107) (0.101) (0.126) (0.0933) (0.123)
Adjusted R2 0.591 0.597 0.59 0.644 0.637
N 54 54 54 47 47
Note: Analysis of term liberalism in civil rights and liberties cases. OLS coefficients
are reported with standard errors in parentheses. * = Significant at the 0.05 level
(one-tailed).
The empirical results are consistent with a Court that targets an ideologically opti-
mal body of law by canceling out ideological imbalances from the past. The statistical
power gained from combining the policy areas appears to outweigh any loss from com-
bining unrelated cases into a single measure. In the models including all cases, the
effects of Cumulative Liberalism and Liberal Authority are statistically significantly
negative and larger in magnitude than in any of the individual legal domains. This is
further evidence of a strong tendency to correct general ideological imbalances of its
past.
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Table 3.4: Term-Level Liberalism in Economic Activity Cases
I II III IV V
Liberalismt−1 -0.0841 – -0.076 – -0.1
(0.134) – (0.132) – (0.139)
Cumulative Liberalism – -0.0282* -0.0276* – –
– (0.0148) (0.015) – –
Liberal Authority – – – -0.315* -0.303*
– – – (0.161) (0.164)
Public Opinion -0.00102 -0.00132 -0.00119 0.00321 0.00335
(0.00406) (0.00396) (0.00398) (0.00456) (0.00458)
Court Ideology 0.734* 0.58* 0.629* 0.55* 0.614*
(0.12) (0.0998) (0.131) (0.106) (0.137)
Adjusted R2 0.607 0.626 0.623 0.605 0.604
N 54 54 54 47 47
Note: Analysis of term level liberalism in economic activity cases. OLS coefficients
are reported with standard errors in parentheses. * = Significant at the 0.05 level
(one-tailed).
3.5 Conclusion
Many scholars claim that the conservative jurisprudence of recent Supreme Courts can
be understood as a reaction to the liberal doctrine of the Warren Court. In other
words, the body of law has taken a rightward turn because of a prolonged leftward
trajectory. This phenomenon, that the Court moves in the opposing direction of the
ideological balance of its past doctrine, has never been considered in the context of
a general theoretical or empirical model. It is well-established that (1) the Court is
concerned with subsequent preferable treatment of its decisions and (2) future users
of its decisions tend to respond to a rich build-up of law rather than individual cases
in isolation. I show that these two facts combine to create an incentive for the Court
to target an ideologically optimal body of law, correcting (i.e. negatively reacting to)
ideological imbalances of its past. Empirical analysis of the ideological content of the
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Supreme Court’s decisions on the merits from the 1953-2008 terms provides strong
support for the theoretical model. The modern Court’s reaction to the Warren years
is not an isolated instance. In general, the Court strives for an ideologically optimal
body of law, and in so doing acts to cancel out ideological biases of the past.
The primary implication of the main finding in the current analysis is that scholar-
ship on the U.S. Supreme Court should proceed with the assumption that the Court is
striving to produce an ideologically optimal body of law rather than individual cases.
This finding represents a foundational change to the common theoretical approach of
treating the individual case as the independent unit of analysis. Reconsideration of
many relationships – from the impact of public opinion to the strategic considerations
in opinion assignment – in the context of a Court striving for an ideologically ideal line
of decisions may lead to theoretical innovations in the explanation of Court decision-
making. For instance, a theoretical perspective – that the Court responds to precedent
– has long eluded strong empirical support. A simple reading of the theory of stare
decisis would predict that liberal precedents would lead to liberal decisions. A self-
correcting Court would react in the opposite way, turning in a conservative direction in
response to liberally biased preceding decisions. The negative reaction to previous law
is subtle, a few percentage points at most. It is possible that (1) the tendency for self-
correction has muddled the effect of precedent in past studies and/or (2) a constraining
impact of precedent tempers the tendency for self correction in the current study. Fu-
ture studies should consider the ways in which precedent would effect a self-correcting
Court.
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